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ABSTRACT 
The term ‘God’ may be understood as the desire for the complete epistemological 
condition of thought; language expresses this condition in statements of ‘meaning.’  
‘Religion’ expresses this desire in texts and ritual practice which may be examined by in  
academic study; however, because the ‘third term’ of religio is understood as the 
condition of being ‘bounded to or by,’ the study of religion is itself bounded to or by this 
desire for the completion of thought.  This desire cannot be understood as an ‘alterity’ of 
thought but is rather the internal native or ‘alter-native’ condition of thought itself.  
Religions are the native residences of this desire, and claim to know the complete 
condition; however, alter-natively, because thought cannot completely restrict but rather 
remains itself an expression of the condition, human thought and its culture are open to 
an unrestricted examination of the expressions of the condition.  Each religion expresses 
itself as a ‘singularity’ of this universal condition of thought; however, because of the 
native factors in the epistemological condition, specifically, that thought desires but 
cannot fully express or know the condition, no particular religion can claim hegemony to 
the expression of the condition:  ‘God’ as such is the full expression of thought, yet by 
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the definition of the terms of thought, its expression remains fully its alter-native 
exception of thought.     
The thesis first considers the possibility of theory itself through a brief 
examination of etymological gaps and windows evident in its expression.   Next, we 
examine a possible working theory for the study of religion and the epistemological 
implications arising from its expression.  Thirdly, as a result of these two courses, we 
examine the semantic and semiotic conditions of what can be ‘called’ ‘meaning.’  The 
thesis concludes with proposed epistemological strategies for the study of culture and 
religion, including what are termed the eccentric semantic and semiotic loops, the 
potentiation of meaning in the instantiation and disinstantiation of language figurations, 
singularity in meaning expressions, and the unique singularity of religious meaning in 
what may be termed the “exceptional inception” of thought. 
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I. Introduction of the Thesis 
Our thesis will consider the following propositions: 
1. The term ‘God’ may be understood as the desire for the complete 
epistemological condition of thought; language expresses this condition in 
statements of ‘meaning.’ 
2. ‘Religion’ expresses this desire in texts and ritual practice which may be 
considered in academic study; however, because the ‘third term’ of religio 
is understood as the condition of being ‘bounded to or by,’ the study of 
religion is itself bounded to this desire for the completion of thought.   
3. This desire for the complete epistemological condition of thought cannot 
be understood as an ‘alterity’ of thought but is rather the internal native or 
‘alter-native’ condition of thought itself. 
4. Religions are the native residences of this desire to know the complete 
condition; however, alter-natively, because thought cannot completely 
restrict this condition but remains itself an expression of the condition, 
human thought and its culture are open to an unrestricted examination of 
the expressions of the condition.   
5. Each religion expresses itself as a ‘singularity’ of this universal condition 
of thought; however, because of the native factors in the epistemological 
condition, specifically, that thought desires but cannot fully express the 
condition, no particular religion can claim hegemony to the expression of 
the condition:  ‘God’ as such is the full expression of thought, yet by the 
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definition of the terms of thought, its expression remains fully its alter-
native excess of thought.     
Our examination of the propositions will proceed along the following course: 
1. First, because of the theoretical nature of the propositions, we will enter 
the study through a consideration of the problem of ‘theory’ itself, and 
specifically the problems that arise from the expression of what we mean 
by theory in the terms and statements of language.  As such we will enter 
the epistemological problem of thought through the portal of language. 
2. Secondly, we will examine a possible working theory for the study of 
religion itself and the epistemological implications and problems that arise 
from its consideration. 
3. Thirdly, because of the discoveries from the first two courses, we will then 
more carefully examine the semantic and semiotic conditions of what we 
call ‘meaning.’ 
4. Finally, we will conclude with proposed epistemological strategies for the 
study of culture and religion.  These strategies include what we term the 
eccentric semantic and semiotic loops, the potentiation of meaning in the 
instantiation and disinstantiation of language structures, singularity in 
meaning expressions, and the unique singularity of religious meaning in 
what we term the exceptional inception.   
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While we consider the thought of many theorists, Gilles Deleuze’s transcendental 
empiricism appears to offer the strongest theoretical basis for the concepts we want to 
introduce to the discourse of religious studies.  In our reading, Deleuze’s thought appears 
to be capable of returning philosophical theory from its coursings in the illusive 
expectation of historical progress back to theory itself.  It appears to be particularly 
rooted in the careful empirical meta-analysis of thought as thought emerges to itself from 
the play of not only language but more importantly from what we will attempt to develop 
from his concept of the passive genesis as the energetics of meaning.  Moreover, his 
development of discordant harmony in the epistemological analysis of the meaning 
register allows for the concept of the singularity of meaning which we attempt to develop 
for religious studies as the exceptional inception of the religious vision of the real.  And 
exactly because of his discovery of the intrinsic discordance and disjunction of the 
figuration of thought, his theory offers the unique ability to decipher the contemporary 
crises of meaning which emanate from the collision of traditional cultures with the 
cultures of the so-called modern and post-modern. 
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II.  A brief deconstruction of the approach to “theory”  
  
How might we consider a theory of religion and …religion(s)…the religious?”  
Let us first briefly consider the possibility of theory in the following formula: “Theory 
asserts a highly self-critical working hypothesis which enables the consideration of the 
terms and conditions and possible heuristic modes or structures of intelligibility and 
meaning of a field of inquiry, a problem, or a problematic.”  We may briefly consider 
the terms of the hypothesis: 
“Theory asserts…”:  “Theory” must first acknowledge that it begins with an 
implicit or explicit approach, that is it carries to the scene of the examination an intrinsic 
point of view and a system of values (including, and in particular, as in the case of 
phenomenology, where the approach asserts an ability to “bracket,” to use its native 
term) of the object of study.  “Theory” moreover brings an assumed semantic meaning to 
the scene.  On the one hand, “theory” appears to originate etymologically not as the 
construction of hypotheses but rather as the act of “viewing” or “seeing.”1 
However, more contemporary use of the term clearly indicates an operation that has 
moved well beyond the sensibility of “seeing” or “viewing” toward a more fully 
developed ideational presentation, or re-presentation of the object of study.  “Theory” in 
its modern expression denotes a “set of statements or principles devised to explain a 
                                                            
1 Late Latin theoria, from Greek theoria, from theoros, spectator : probably thea, a viewing + -oros, seeing (from 
horan, to see) The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by 
Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved; 
thefreedictionary.com. 
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group of phenomena…explanatory statements…methods of analysis…a set of 
theorems…a belief or principle that guides action or assists comprehension…”2  Our 
approach to the “study of…” carries with it both a “seeing”  sensibility as well as what 
appears to be a much more highly developed reasoned set of attitudes and principles:  
both “sense” as seeing (but presumably the full range of the senses) as well as the 
statement or assertion of a more systematic set of rules or principles appears to engage 
theoretical study.      
“a highly self-critical…”:  Further, we are asserting that our theory must project 
a self-critical attitude.  That is, theory, to jump to our next term, must also work on itself.  
“…working hypothesis…”:  Theory “works, it is a working through, both on 
itself and on its object of study   Yet if we acknowledge that an hypothesis is already 
formulated as we discovered above, then we are already asserting that we can study 
religion and culture at all.  The term “hypothesis” therefore denotes:  “1. A tentative 
explanation for an observation, phenomenon, or scientific problem that can be tested by 
further investigation; 2. Something taken to be true for the purpose of argument or 
investigation; an assumption; 3. The antecedent of a conditional statement.”3  The 
etymology of the term is rooted in the Greek “hupotithenai,” derived from “hupothe” 
                                                            
2 Ibid. 
3 The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin 
Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company; thefreedictionary.com. 
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meaning “to suppose” and “tithenai” meaning “to place.”4  Theory or hypothesis is thus 
already supposing possible angles of approach, and it is already placing or situating such 
an approach in relation to the project of study:  it is already “working.” 
“…which enables the consideration…”:  Working theory should enable or 
mobilize investigation.  Theory is already carried by a momentum of curiosity.  Also, the 
term “consideration” denotes “…to think carefully about…to esteem…to look at 
thoughtfully.”5  Here we note intrinsic values of inquiry, i.e., a value system which 
acknowledges “care.”  However the etymology of the term “consider” derives from the 
Latin consīderāre, which means “to contemplate the stars.”6  “Consider” thus implies a 
curiosity to study or account for a more extreme horizon of inquiry.  
“…the terms and conditions and possible heuristic modes or structures of 
intelligibility and meaning…”:  Theory in the humanities thus acknowledges the 
uniquely semantic or linguistic and textual nature of its inquiry, as this brief interrogation 
suggests.  The word “term” denotes both a word structure but also a temporal condition, 
as in a term or period of time, and thus indicates an inception and a “term-inus” of the 
study.7  As noted above, we are already “placed” in a space of hypothesis, and the 
“terms” of the inquiry also indicate the temporal condition of the inquiry.  Theoretical 
inquiry originates from this conjugation of a primary equation, that is, from both the 
                                                            
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Walter W. Skeat, A Concise Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, New York:  Perigee books, 1980, pp. 
107-108.  
7 The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language. 
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temporality of the “seen” or “observed” but also from the term-inologies and statements.  
That is, in addition to its temporal meaning, the word “term” implicates language in the 
equation in two ways.  First, term indicates “a. A word or group of words having a 
particular meaning….” and second, term indicates “b. …language of a certain kind; 
chosen words…”8   
In our consideration, item b will pertain to the semantic condition, that is the 
particular choice of language, the set of terms and then the consequent word-usage 
germane to the field of study.  This semantic condition imparts from the term of the 
equation inquirer/inquired in that the primary temporal/spatial equation implies the 
interaction of the inquirer and the field of inquiry, and the semantic field which arises 
from this equation assumes a consequent interaction of the set of terms and terminology 
in the secondary language event that ensues from the “seeing”:  a semantic texture holds 
in both the primary term (its term or time, and, presumably also the place or site of this 
interaction) as well as the secondary terms which express it.  The text of the inquiry can, 
more or less, be a favorable or accurate expression or re-presentation of the act of seeing 
or observation.  Item a, however, would appear to reach beyond either the initial semantic 
equation of observation or expression.  That is, “meaning” implies yet another level of 
the inquiry which we will term the semiotic condition.  Here we must observe that the 
“term” of the semiotic equation is not merely its interactive structure or “surface”, though 
this is implied – i.e., as we have observed the primary semantic observational interaction 
of the inquirer/inquired and the secondary semantic interactive structure of language are 
                                                            
8 Ibid. 
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required to approach this latent semiotic condition.  What is implied and carried by this 
semantic condition as well as what is implied and what in fact also carries the semantic 
condition itself, however, is the more problematic assumption of the signs and symptoms 
of “meaning”, or, in the terms of our formula, the “…possible heuristic modes or 
structures of intelligibility and meaning”.  “Intelligibility” implies the following:  “1. 
Capable of being understood…; 2. Capable of being apprehended by the intellect alone.”9  
“Capable of being understood…apprehended” already implies the capacity of 
understanding, and as further implied in its root, intellegere – to perceive, it implies the 
capacity to “perceive” the object of study, to interface with it, to observe it, but then to 
perceive it in a way that is “apprehended” or “understood.”  Or, as its Latin root legere or 
lectum implies, “to choose, to pick.”  As Joseph Shipley observes, “From the ability to 
choose the proper letters came the derived meaning of legere, to read:  what is legible is 
what can be picked out.”10  Shipley goes on:   
Few words have more ramifications in English than this Latin one.  A group of 
men picked out for military service is a legion; then, any large number; men 
chosen may be a legation, or legates.  That which is chosen tends to become 
imposed, hence, legal, lawful:  and through Old French leiel, from Latin legalis 
comes its doublet, English loyal.  …To choose together is to make a collection 
(Latin col, from com, together).  To choose among, to discriminate, is to show 
intelligence (Latin intelligere, intellectum, from intellegere, from inter, between 
+ legere), or to be intellectual.   
…Closely bound with this verb – for what you choose, you seek to hold, to bind 
– is Latin ligare, whence Italian legare, to bind…11 
                                                            
9 Ibid, “Middle English, from Old French, from Latin intellegibilis, intelligibilis, from intellegere, to perceive”  
10 Joseph T. Shipley, Dictionary of Word Origins, Totowa, New Jersey:  Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1979, 211. 
11 Ibid. 
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“Intelligibility” thus carries multiple usages:  that is, it first implies understanding, i.e., to 
perceive or apprehend; next it implies a reading, from its root legere, to choose but also 
to “read”; and finally, from its etymological connection to ligare, it implies “to bind” or 
“be bounded to” which we note is also the root for the term “religion.”  We will suggest 
that there is a subtle and obscure but crucial distinction rooted in the term intelligibility.  
On the one hand, intelligibility  implies understanding which ensues from the literal 
semantic condition of word usage and reading; on the other hand, intelligibility implies 
what we will assert is a semiotic condition of “boundedness” to “symptoms” of meaning 
which exceed yet which are nonetheless expressed and bound to language.   
While the term “intelligibility” and its root are complex, the terms “to mean” or 
“meaning” occupy over 6 pages of the OED and further expand the scope of the inquiry.  
Briefly, “to mean” carries the following three groups of reference:  (1) “to have in mind, 
intend. [English and Middle English menen]12 hence to express significance or intention, 
to “stand for, symbolize, typify, symbolise, represent”13; (2) “common”14 but also as in 
“geometric mean or arithmetic mean …the average value of a set of numbers”15; (3) 
“intermediate”16 or “the middle point, state, or course between limits or extremes”17 also 
                                                            
12 Ibid, 321. 
13 Based on WordNet 3.0, Farlex clipart collection. © 2003-2008 Princeton University, Farlex Inc.; freedictionary.com. 
14 Ibid. 
15 The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin 
Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company; freedictionary.com. 
16 Shipley, Dictionary of Word Origins, 321. 
17 Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged © HarperCollins Publishers  2003; freedictionary.com. 
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used extensively in economics.  “Meaning” then appears to encompass a broad set of 
potential usages.  Initially we will assert that meaning pertains to that expression of 
signification which stands “in” or “for” or emerges from the middle or medium ground 
of the interaction of the inquirer and the object of inquiry.  As we are discovering, the 
terms in our formula appear to both express this signification and interaction yet also to 
exceed it.  This excess potential appears not to be a question of “what” meaning 
communicates or signifies.  Rather, the more radical claim of our thesis points to “how” 
meaning is potentiated at all.  Furthermore, we will claim that as such any semantic 
(textual) or semiotic (signs and symptoms) configuration of the registers of meaning will 
be seen to emerge from a potentiating “background” which exceeds yet contains its 
expressions.  We will attempt to develop a concept of “meaning” which interfaces what 
we have termed its expressed semantic condition in conjugation with what we have 
termed its semiotic condition to account for the potential of its complete equation, and we 
will further assert that this equation offers a unique challenge to the study of culture and 
religion.    
“…of a field of inquiry, a problem, or a problematic.”:  Finally, we 
acknowledge that our approach has a design which derives not only from its own 
theoretical angle of approach but also from the unique designated field or focus of 
inquiry:  we are examining “some-thing,” either a field of inquiry, a particular concern or 
problem, or in this case a “revisioning of the registers of meaning in the study of culture 
and religion.”  “Field of inquiry,” however, already assumes that a “field” is open for 
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interrogation, that is that it can be subject to such a theoretical approach or a method of 
examination.  This seems acceptable for the study of the natural world, as in, for 
example, the categorical study and taxonomic classification of the species.  We note, 
however, that our “field” is designated as “culture and religion.”  While this field may 
indeed offer certain “empirical” indicators (for example, observable religious rituals or 
religious texts) the complete field or our ability to apprehend it should remain in question 
from the outset.  Our assumption as to the accessibility to the “field of study” renders, 
again, at least two dimensions.  On the one hand, what is assumed is the obvious 
objective “field of study”:  i.e., we are assuming, as from the outset, that “theory” or “the 
hypothetical” can designate a specific territory of investigation, and that these territories 
might be isolated and then observed or interrogated, and that they can then be rendered 
into descriptive or interpretive discourse – we can designate this dimension of “field” as 
the “objective field.”  Yet we further note that the assumption of intelligibility as well as 
the objective field of religion, rooted in ligare, imply a “boundedness to” a condition or 
set of data which would seem to be exceed direct empirical accessibility or purely 
descriptive expression.  The unique background of culture and religion appears to be 
expressed in this “bounded to” condition.            
Initial Summary of the Formula 
 Initial observations appear to figure a ‘surface’ and a ‘depth’ level of complexity 
to the terms of the formula: 
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Theory:  surface text:  “…set of hypothetical statements or possible angles of 
intelligibility;”  alternative sub-text:  “the act of seeing.”  
Self-criticality:  surface text:  “…assumes the availability of the study as 
study…” –e.g. academic pretense; alternative sub-text:  observer’s subjective self-
awareness of the “subjectification” of the object of study. 
Hypothetical:  surface text:  “…asserted explanation, set of explanatory “thesis or 
theses;” alternative sub-text:  “already placed, sited.” 
Consider:  surface text:  “to regard, account for, form an opinion or angle of 
regard for;” alternative sub-text:  “see the stars.” 
Terms & conditions of “meaning:”  surface text:  “emergent and intermediating 
expression;” alternative sub-depth text:  “a potentiating and excessive background.”  
Field of inquiry:  surface text:  “actual field of study;” alternative sub-text:  “the 
observer’s angle of approach.”  
We have pursued this brief etymological exercise merely to attempt to introduce a 
“sense” of the rich but challenging complexity of any concept or theory of meaning.  This 
sense carries and leaves a multiplicity of terms and textures of a landscape rather than 
clear and well defined maps or geographies.  It appears that in each of the isolated terms 
“the theoretical” presents “fields” of counter-valences or heterogeneous levels of 
definition which then suggest working, interactive levels of complexity, both from within 
the isolated terms of the formula as well as in possible formulations of the hypothetical 
situation itself.   
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We step back and observe the terms “consider” and “terms/conditions” in the 
formula.  Each present both a surface (e.g., consider:  “…to regard…account for…”; 
terms/conditions:  “…semantic arrangement…”) as well as what we might stipulate as an 
“alternativity”  or a “depth” (e.g., consider:  “...see the stars…”; terms/conditions:  “…the 
meaning of…”).  This sense of complexity would appear to hold in an arrangement of 
subtle and accepted overdetermination. 
This brief deconstructive examination of a hypothetical approach to theory results 
in a complexity of meaning; we are pressured in its reading to accept a “sense” of each of 
its terms separately, and furthermore to accept a momentum of the composite statement 
which exceeds the immediate statement yet which is nonetheless expressed in the 
statement.      
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III. A Working Hypothesis:  Rite, Text, Boundedness … 
“Religion” is not a native term; it is a term created by scholars for their intellectual 
purposes and therefore is theirs to define.  It is a second-order, generic concept that plays the 
same role in establishing a disciplinary horizon that a concept such as “language” plays in 
linguistics or “culture” plays in anthropology.  There can be no disciplined study of religion 
without such a horizon.18    
Our thesis – or more specifically our hypo-thesis – is that postmodern religious thought 
and so-called “postmodern theology” in this age of the event has systematically and bizarrely 
failed to consider the singularity behind the event from which it claims to speak – the 
religious per se.19     
We propose the following formula for our study: 
 
“The academic study of culture and religion considers the texts and rituals and 
possible heuristic modes or structures of intelligibility of the individual’s or a 
culture’s account of the human condition and its confrontation with and 
boundedness to the “divine” or the “the religious.”   
      
A conundrum of any proposed study confronts us:  Where to begin?  Even our 
somewhat careful introductory attempt to outline the nature of theory leaves us with the 
sense that we begin already “in” a study, a situation, a “middle” of “meaning,” hence an 
arrangement of signification – as observed, the “site” and “sight” and “sign” of the 
hypothesis.  “Text,” “ritual,” and “boundedness” will be the initial terms of our inquiry 
and the middle expressions of the beginning of our discussion.  We note from the outset 
that this middle appears somehow “looped.”  That is, the presence of the third expression 
of the term “religious,” boundedness, appears to fold over or conjugate the first two 
terms.   The third term will be left open by intention at this stage.  That is, boundedness 
                                                            
18 Jonathan Z. Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious”, in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor, 
Chicago:  U. Chicago Press, 1998, pp. 281-282. 
19 Carl Raschke, Event Horizon Manuscript, unpublished, 8. 
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will hold as a background in the observation of text and ritual which they would appear to 
claim to be “bound to…by...” or “witness to…”  the “divine.”    
Etymological Concerns:  Encounter with the problem of language and signification 
Jonathan Z. Smith, in “Religion, Religions, Religious” notes:  “The term 
‘religion’ has had a long history…its etymology is uncertain...one of three current 
possibilities, that it stems from the root *leig meaning “to bind” rather than from roots 
meaning “to reread” or “to be careful…”20 Three “sub-fields” within the field thus arise 
from this initial etymological spectrum:   
(1) “care” attending to “ritual obligations or performance”; 
(2) to read or re-read, [“used by Cicero, connected with relegĕre, to read over 
again”21];  
(3) the act or state or condition of being connected or bound by or to (ligare: to 
bind). 
1 and 2 suggest surface arrangements which would seem to lend themselves to 
“study.”  First, “care” in the performance of the rituals, habits, and customs of religious 
practice would appear to be accessible on the surface to various angles of study:  e.g., the 
descriptive study of a particular religious rite or the collective rites of a religion, as well 
as the possible comparative study of rites of various and varying religions.  Second, to 
“read” or “re-read” presents both the act of what is meant by “reading/re-reading” as well 
                                                            
20 Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious,” 269. 
21 OED, Compact Edition, 2481.  
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as the “content” of what is read.  However, we note that “reading” might still imply oral 
discourse.  For example, Homeric discourse but likely every ancient religion was 
mnemonically “transmitted.”  The inscription of “texts” as such occurs already after the 
scene of oral discourse.  Then secondarily, “reading/re-reading” suggests not merely the 
primary reading or presentation of a discourse but now, with the pre-fix “re-”, also 
genetic to re-ligion/re-ligare, “re-reading” implies a “reading of the reading…” or 
inference to the interpretation of the discourse.    These two strains of ligare appear to 
have been the surface concern of “religious” studies, particularly in the attempt to 
originate maps of the myriad arrangements of religious practice and then to disseminate 
discussion of these arrangements in careful or disciplined descriptions, comparisons, or 
interpretations.       
However, as we have noted, theme 3 of ligare or ligio, “to be bound to or by” 
presents a more complex problem.  We suspect that it is likely carefully hidden in the 
first two strategies of ligare/ligio.  That is, the “care-filled” rituals or oral/inscribed texts 
of a religious culture can be studied in a more empirical manner – there is “stuff” to 
observe, “rites” to describe, even people to interview, and discourse text to “read.”  
Moreover, reference to the telos or horizon of orientation, the goal of the rite or text, 
whether the Bodhisattva, Nirvana, God, Jesus of Nazareth, The Straight Path of Islam, 
redemption, etc., can be “read,” noted, and described in the context of the practiced ritual 
or discourse.  Indeed, even the outlined third formula above, that is “the act or state or 
condition of being connected or bound by or to (ligare: to bind),” may imply that the 
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“act” or “condition” of “being connected to or by…” is in fact observable, describable, 
readable.  “Study” of the third theme appears to remain in the domain of possible 
empirical “data,” at least from an anthropological angle.  
Curiously, J.Z. Smith will claim that “…while there is a staggering amount of 
data, of phenomena, of human experience and expression that might be characterized in 
one culture or another, by one criterion or another, as religious – there is no data for 
religion… .”22  How is it that what appear to be observable and describable “data,” i.e., 
rite and text, are re-stated into the status of “…there is no data...”?  Smith is at once (a) 
carefully mapping the methodological limits of the study and (b) stipulating that this 
empirical methodology, which he observes is “purely academic,” nonetheless appears to 
stipulate, in its own interior academic limitations, its own “third term.”  The study of 
religion is thus “bounded by” text and ritual, but this interiority is itself also “bounded to” 
an ulteriority, that is a data set which exceeds rite and ritual.  The formula loops back on 
itself.  Therefore, Smith wants to expand the field of study to include what he terms the 
“theological,” although he will also attempt to restrict that field as such:   
I have come to believe that a prime object of study for the historian of religion 
ought to be theological tradition, taking the term in its widest sense, in particular, 
those elements of the theological endeavor that are concerned with canon and its 
exegesis.  …The task of application as well as the judgment of the relative 
adequacy of particular applications to a community’s life situation remains the 
indigenous theologian’s task, but the study of the process, particularly the study 
of comparative systematic and exegesis, ought to become a major preoccupation 
of the historian of religion.23  
                                                            
22 Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, xi. 
23 Ibid, 43. 
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Smith’s claims both address and raise a question for our study.  On the one hand, 
we can agree on his assertion that a history of religion is incomplete without 
consideration of the “canon” (text) and its “persistent, and obsessive religious activity” 
(ritualized application of the text in culture), we would counter that it is more problematic 
to “bracket” the situation of revelation from the scholar’s purview.  He is forwarding the 
expansion of the possible field of study of the first two terms, while claiming a 
phenomenological ability to limit the possible consideration of the third term to the “the 
indigenous theologian’s task…” We can agree:  the study of a culture’s literal text and 
ritual, of its expression and more formalized interpretation and the examination of the 
“character” and origin of its revelatory message will by definition remain within the 
existential field of the believer and the analytical field of that culture’s theological 
speakers.   
However, two interior issues arise.  First, the study of “the religions” as cultural 
pluralities is called into question from the comparative aspect of the academic discipline.  
If we intend the scope of our study to address the field of all religions and their 
interaction then our theory will require a method and a conceptual framework which may 
account for not merely the intra-specific (indigenous) nature of religion but must include 
the inter-specific (comparative) encounters between religious cultures.  Obviously, the 
encounter of the possibility of an indigenous and the comparative studies of religion 
occurs in their expressions in language.  Secondly, we observe that the expansion of the 
study of the first two terms (text, ritual) to Smith’s “theological” category has not 
  
19 
 
removed the insinuation of the third term as internally implied in the first two.  We 
cannot implicate a term like the “theological tradition…in its widest sense” without a 
careful and thoughtful consideration of this very “sense.”  The historian of religion’s 
focus notwithstanding, we suggest that it will be methodologically implausible to 
effectively bracket the term in the manner Smith intends without severely constricting the 
study of the first two terms themselves.  Indeed, the activities of text and ritual 
“obsessively” pressure the third term de facto.  “Bounded to or by,” from the expanded 
focus of a theory of “…religion…religions…the religious,” appears to explicitly 
implicate a working definitional third term, and moreover this third term appears to 
implicitly implicate at least part of the ulterior motive and aim of the first two terms.  
This sense of ulteriority is empirically observable in text and ritual and thereby cannot be 
bracketed from the theoretical angle of our approach.24                    
Indeed, it is just this “self-critical” awareness of the academic limitations of the 
angle of approach to the study which “constitutes [the student’s] primary expertise, his 
foremost object of study.”25  Smith stipulates a careful academic method:  “First, that the 
exemplum has been well and fully understood…Second, that the exemplum be displayed 
in the service of some…theory, paradigm, some fundamental question…Third, that there 
be some method for explicitly relating the exemplum to the theory, paradigm, or question 
                                                            
24 Smith’s choice of the sub-title, ”From Babylon to Jonestown,” could not have been unintentional as it implicates not 
only the historical spectrum of religion but not unsubtly its spectrum of signification – for example, what do we think 
we can “mean” by religion after Jamestown?  
25 Smith, Imagining Religion, xi. 
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and some method for evaluating each in terms of the other.”26 So, we can affirm that 
Smith’s enterprise seeks its own internal principles of bracketing and focus in order to 
tightly define its approach, what Paul Ricoeur27 might reference as a “hermeneutics of 
suspicion.”  Nonetheless, we are suggesting that such a study uncovers in the nature and 
excess of its own data a complementary “hermeneutics of expansion”28 suggested by the 
theoretical field of the “bounded to or by” – and we could let Smith introduce the term 
“…theological…” – which appear necessary to complete the study of 
“…religion…religions…religious…”  It is granted that these are already theoretical, 
scholarly, and what Smith calls “generic concepts” which are outside the indigenous field 
of historical study.  Applying a generic examination, however, one not tied to a specific 
religious tradition but rather to “religion” itself as an academic field, constitutes what 
Smith himself terms “…a second-order generic concept that plays the same role in 
establishing a disciplinary horizon that a concept such as ‘language’ plays in linguistics 
or ‘culture’ plays in anthropology.  There can be no disciplined study of religion without 
such a horizon.”29    
We appear to have briefly considered the formula for a method of study and its 
limits in approaching its data-set or field of study, yet our study remains empirically 
unsatisfied because we have not as yet addressed the third term, nor have we allowed the 
                                                            
26 Ibid, xi-xii. 
27 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy:  An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage, Yale University Press, 1970. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious”, pp. 281-282, my emphasis in italics.    
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third term to address our method.  The equation proposed by the consideration of ligare 
or ligio or re-ligio has discovered but not sufficiently accounted for the full etymological 
referability of its horizon of interrogation, that is the implication of its “boundedness to or 
by.”  And subjectively, we confess an unfulfilled “desire for …” a fuller address and 
redress and accountability of this momentum and its “horizon.”  Furthermore, we want to 
claim that this lack arises from the equation itself, that it has empirical roots, and that it is 
suggested in the etymology of the term “religion.”  The focus of its scope retrenches 
Smith’s equation to include an ulterior sense to the study’s concern.  This concern resides 
as a gap or lacunae, an aporia, in the equation of “…religion…religion(s)…the religious.” 
We may have encountered what Raschke terms “…the portmanteau sense of the 
Roman word religio, which classical and even some current etymologies trace to the 
word ligare, to “bind” or to “bind tightly.”30  We can note the intrinsic confusion which 
surrounds the etymological roots, and we can further note all three areas of focus appear 
plausible for our study.  What can be implied by “portmanteaus sense?” 
 “Gilles Deleuze, in Logic of Sense considers Lewis Carol’s use of portmanteau 
words as such: 
It seems then that the portmanteau word is grounded upon a strict 
disjunctive synthesis.  …we discover the law of the portmanteau word in 
general, provided that we disengage each time the disjunction which may have 
been hidden.  …in Carroll’s work, we must distinguish three sorts of esoteric 
words:  contracting words, which perform a synthesis of succession over a single 
series and bear upon the syllabic elements of a proposition or a succession of 
propositions in order to extract from them their composite sense (“connection”); 
circulating words, which perform a synthesis of coexistence and coordination 
between two heterogeneous series and which directly and at once bear upon the 
                                                            
30 Raschke, Event Horizon Manuscript, unpublished, 48. 
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respective senses of these series (“conjunction”); and disjunctive or portmanteau 
words, which perform an infinite ramification of coexisting series and bear at 
once upon words and senses, or syllabic and semiological elements 
(“disjunction”).  The ramifying function or the disjunctive synthesis offers the 
real definition of the portmanteau word.31   
Deleuze may be providing an initial hint at our problem, but our terms, 
“…religion…religions…religious…” are only indirectly implied as carrying the 
portmanteau sense:  our terms are not Lewis Carroll portmanteau terms which combine 
words but rather our terms combine and carry as portmanteau baggage possible meanings 
of an indefinite data-set of terms.  That is, we are noting on the one hand that ligare is 
connected with “text” and “rite” and on the other hand with “binding” or “re-
binding…to…or by…”, and the focus or origination of this second term remains open 
and in question.  The former terms offer available fields of inquiry, that is the notable (as 
in “text”) or observable (as in “ritual”), which correspond to Deleuze’s use of 
“contracting words which perform a synthesis of succession of propositions in order to 
extract from them their composite sense (“connection”) as well as to “circulating words, 
which perform a synthesis of coexistence and coordination between two heterogeneous 
series and which directly and at once bear upon the respective senses of these series 
(“conjunction”)…”:  that is, we can stipulate, in the academic “sense”, that it is possible 
to contractually agree upon a field or fields of discourse which, though continually 
criticized, offer an academic and disciplined approach to a given field of study, and we 
can further stipulate that this same academy, by nature of its discursive interaction, may 
                                                            
31 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, New York:  Columbia U. Press, 2003, pp. 46-47. 
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tend to agree upon, though still under the discipline’s argumentative scrutiny, 
“connecting” or “synthetic” observations which serve to “perform a synthesis of 
coexistence and coordination…”  We encountered these “contracting” and “circulating” 
conditions in our brief examination of theory, that is a ‘sense’ of theory appeared to 
emerge from the set of terms even though each of the terms carried both a surface 
definition as well as alternative sub-textual uses.       
However, we must then observe – and it appears that this observation is, in 
Deleuze’s terms,  a “necessary” condition of the field of study in the contracted and 
synthetic data (the “read/re-read” and the “rite”) the insinuation of the third term of re-
ligare/re-ligio, that is the “bounded to…bounded by.”   That is, observing “rite” and 
“reading” in an empirical study cannot avoid including in these sub-fields the “reference 
to” (“boundedness to…”) and the “referability by” (“bounded by…”) the field of study to 
“what…horizon…what address or response…?”  Embedded in the contracted and 
connected text there appears what Deleuze refers to above as “…an infinite ramification 
of coexisting series…[that] bear at once upon words and senses, or syllabic and 
semiological elements.”   
We can observe that his “portmanteau term” is itself “semantic,” that is, text-
bound in its initial explication.  Yet the meaning exceeds its textual reference:  the 
contracting and synthetic senses texualize sense, while the portmanteau references a 
condition(s) of meaning of a single term.  The meaning is not purely contracted or 
synthetic but rather open to an unbounded horizon of reference.  The literal semantic 
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meaning32, and we will use the term semantic to refer to the contracted and circulated use 
of language, also carries an internal alternative and symptomatic condition, a semiotic 
condition.  The term “semiotics” itself appears to express a pivotal and seminal “sense” 
as it references the approach to a concept of “meaning.”  That is, “semiotics” derives 
from the Greek  “semeiotikos, observant of signs, significant, from semeiosis, indication, 
from semeioun, to signal, to interpret as a sign, from semeion, sign, from sema”33 – in 
this first sense the semiotic condition may pertain to the condition of language as a 
system of signs.  However, we note that partnered or alternative uses of “semiotic” 
pertain at once to the interpretation of such signs on the one hand, and on the other hand 
“…of or relating to symtomatology” or the symptomatological study of, in this case, 
language structures.34  An epistemology of meaning appears to include both the semantic 
and semiotic conditions.   
As such, we will attempt to further define and expand “semiotics” to regard not 
merely language or sign systems but rather to address a more comprehensive accounting 
of the entire “field” of meaning and meaning systems including and in particular what 
might be inferred by the symptoms of meaning, or a symtomatology of meaning.  In 
particular, the use of “religion” to mean “…bounded to or by…” constitutes a “condition” 
or possibly an “event” of meaning rather than a specifiable reference.  However, at this 
                                                            
32 We will use the term “semantic” in its linguistic sense, that is:  “Of or relating to meaning, especially meaning in 
language.”  (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by 
Houghton Mifflin Company; freedictionary.com) 
 
33 The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin 
Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company.  thefreedictionary.com. 
34 Ibid. 
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juncture we can note that this meaning condition carries and implies two alternative 
horizons:  on the one hand, systems of language, what we are denoting as the “semantic” 
function, or the use of language to convey, more or less empirically, data, observable 
facts, and communication in general; and, on the other hand, the “semiotic” implies both 
the interpretation of what such meanings in fact mean, and more curiously how meaning 
itself can imply the appearance of symptoms of meaning – thus interpretation also 
implies symptomatology, or the study of the possible symptoms of meaning which hold 
in excess of or appear to be only suggested by their significations.  For now we carry both 
senses forward, but as will be suggested further forward, both the semantic and the 
semiotic conditions find themselves predicated upon “strange loops” of contingency and 
dependence with one another within the visioning of our study. 
For example, Deleuze, above, refers to this condition as the “…infinite 
ramification of coexisting series [which] bears at once upon words and senses or syllabic 
and semiological elements (“disjunction”).”  The disjunctive, in “religious” studies or the 
study of “religion,” appears to be at once expressed and hidden in discourse.  We can 
note this in the following: 
“It is not a question of knowing God when the veil be lifted but of knowing Him 
in the veil itself.” 35   
“God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived.” 36   
In both statements we can identify “contracting” and “circulating” functions of discourse.  
All of the terms, that is, “question,” “God,” “knowing,” “veil,” or “God,” “nothing,”  
                                                            
35 Shaikh Ahmad Al-‘Alawī, Hikmatu-hu, Sagesse, in Lings, Martin, A Sufi Saint of the 20th Century:  Shaikh Ahmad 
Al-‘Alawī, Berkeley:  University of California Press, 2nd Edition, 1971, 211.  
36 St. Anselm. 
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“conceived,” etc., are stipulated to carry contracted or agreed upon “meanings,” and 
furthermore perform a more or less communally accepted or circulating function – the 
delivery of the statements is on their surface “intelligible.”  As such, the signs are 
interpretable.  Yet that which is intelligible is in fact the subversion of intelligibility itself 
in the ramifying pressure of the portmanteau function.  The “veil” in the first statement, 
itself imaginable as an empirically observable object, now can carry and signify “God”; 
the contracted, circulated terms carry the disjunctive portmanteau “term” but this carriage 
is more of an implied “sense” than a specific or referable term or object; as such, the 
excess sense of the statement now holds meaning more as the “symptom” of this sense 
than a purely referable object.  St. Anselm’s statement, already an abstraction, might be 
expressed even more abstractly:  “‘God’ ‘signifies’ the ‘concept’ of that which exceeds 
conceptualization.”  Pure contractual notation is disjoined by the very “logical” 
contracted and synthetic concept of language.  Like a Zen koan, signification is disjoined 
by signification.  What remains is a symptomatic “sense” of the excess yet this excess is 
immanently a figuration of discourse itself. 
      These statements, and their portmanteau interrogation, may reveal what has 
become latently hidden in religious studies theory and method.  That is, the contracting 
and circulating discourse (e.g., the anthropological, sociological, description of rite and 
ritual, or in one scholar’s reading or re-reading of a second scholar’s secondary academic 
description of rite or text, etc.) has tended to override and to hide the third function 
which, in contracting and circulating discourse, is in fact only latently or indirectly 
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stipulated, i.e., “…God…the religious…”  Furthermore, even when referenced, i.e., 
“God” or “Krishna,” these terms remain in their contracted and circulated status because 
the portmanteau function is an alternative condition of discourse rather than explicitly or 
semantically stated.  “God” can be, and usually remains, particularly in a scientifically 
veiled academic culture, limited to a contracted and circulated agreed upon reference.    
If surface discourse is bounded in the contracted and circulating function of 
discourse, then the interrogation of the portmanteau function is therefore not available to 
a semantic critical strategy alone.  It will rather require a complementary but tightly 
defined depth semiotic.  Such a depth semiotic is required to further interrogate the 
function of language as a veiling phenomenon.  It would suggest that it is the 
conditionality of language itself which hides and obscures the portmanteau function, that 
“…seeing Him in the veil itself…” is tantamount to a semiotic rather than semantic 
critique of discourse, or alternatively the semantic dismantling of the veil of the semantic.  
Likewise, a depth semiotic will require a semantic discourse and will be carried on the 
back of the contracted and the circulating:  the depth is spoken on the surface.  
Excess of the Semantic Field 
The excess of the semantic field, again here limited to the use of contracted and 
circulating words in propositions or statements of meaning, appears evident in our earlier 
examination of the proposition for a working theory.  This excess constitutes the need for 
the contractual and then circulating functions themselves:  the speakers must agree upon 
the use of language terms, and the success of language’s circulation will turn on the 
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degree of this contractual definition and clarity, and what we will later introduce as its 
“economic exchangeability.” 
Contractual/Consensus:  Consensus insinuates both a linguistic and a non-
linguistic condition to the semantic condition of meaning in language.  First, the 
linguistic function indicates there is agreement as to “what” a term may or may not mean:   
hypothetically, the literal meaning of a term is given, considered in context, negotiated 
between speakers, and then applied (circulated).  But secondly, we must observe the non-
linguistic or energetic function to this semantic agreement in the form of a “will to 
accept” or a “momentum/force of agreement” – contract implies a firm agreement but 
contract arrived at by consensus implies a non-linguistic “will” or “force of agreement” 
in order to agree upon definitional terms between speakers in discourse. 
Deleuze’s employs a concept of “singularity” to pressure a structuralist 
assumption of possible meaning.  This critique works from within the structuralist 
assumption that meaning structures may be configured or expressed as the “signifier” 
which expresses a “signified.”  For Deleuze,  
Structures are fields composed of at least two series or sets of conjoined but 
differential singular points, for example the signifiers and signifieds of structural 
linguistics; these series can only connect to produce meaning if they are traversed 
by a paradoxical element, which is not something common to both series but 
different from them.  Difference relates to difference not through some similarity 
but through difference, through a kind of resonance that Deleuze calls 
“intensity.”37   
                                                            
37 Timothy Murphy, Syracuse University, Singularity, Encyclopedia of Postmodernism, New York:  Routledge, 2001, 
pp. 370-371. 
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For example, terms used above such as “God” and “veil” or “God” and 
“conceived,” while implying a conjunction, are conjoined rather as “differential singular 
points” which on the surface appear not to carry immediate reference.  “Veil” is a 
garment to hide one’s face or the surface of an object, and “conceived” is an abstract term 
of thought.  Neither express “God” until the expression is potentiated by their 
conjunction.  Yet meaning is either implied or carried by their singular expression in 
what Deleuze will note is not the semantic likeness or commonality but rather the 
conjunction of their difference by the force of “intensity.”  Here we can note that 
intensity cannot be a semantic “structure” as such but rather intensity deploys an 
energetic of force to the equation of meaning.  Discussing the relation of philosophy to 
differential mathematics and specifically Hoöne Wronski’s Philosophie de l’infini, 
Deleuze subtly introduces three radically transformative concepts to the epistemological 
equation of meaning:  force, potential, and value:   
...the differential is indeed pure power, just as the differential relation is a pure 
element of potentiality. 
     A principle of complete determination corresponds to this element of 
potentiality.  Complete determination must not be confused with reciprocal 
determination.  The latter concerned the differential relations and their degrees or 
varieties in the Idea which correspond to diverse forms.  The former concerns the 
values of a relation…38 
 
Each concept expresses the problematic of an energetics of meaning which forces 
meaning structures past a threshold of clear or cleanly definable reference.  However, 
Deleuze appears not be excluding structure as such, rather “reciprocal determinations” of 
the signifier and signified are subsumed in the “complete determination.”  The semantic 
                                                            
38 Gilles Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, New York:  Columbia University Press, 1994, 175. 
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condition, comprised on its surface of linguistic structures which contract and circulate 
surface signification and reference, nonetheless expresses these differentiating 
“structures” in an energetics of meaning.  Structures are subject to a consensual will, are 
only potentiated at the moment of their expression, and the meaning of any expression is 
always subject to pre-existent valuation.  Any abstraction to a universal basis or value for 
discourse is itself possible as a potential reciprocal reference, yet such a reference is itself 
subject to the energetics of the complete determination which pre-potentiates and pre-
values its expression.  Rather, the expression of the universal is potentiated in the 
singularity of the event of meaning, but this event is always differentiating, is always 
already expressed in its value assumptions, and the event is always energized by a will 
that must be in excess of the semantic event itself.          
The non-linguistic “will” to accept is driven by the undecidability and 
multiplicities of the linguistic condition itself:  the semantic meaning frequently if not 
always speaks from a multiple set of possible meanings of a term (as we observed in our 
etymological analysis of the terms of general theory) as well as to multiple sets of 
possible speakers.  DiCenso, observing Freud’s primary and then Derrida’s and Ricoeur’s 
secondary analyses, notes both the problem of an overdetermination of semantic meaning 
as well as the overinterpretation of possible symptoms of meaning, both of which derive 
from the multiplicity or pluralization of semantic meaning and the lack of a pre-
consensual foundation to the semantic:      
…in The Interpretation of Dreams notions of overdetermination and 
overinterpretation anticipate the rejection of paradigms of univocity by 
contemporary theories.  Overdetermination applies to formative influences in the 
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genesis of dreams, symptoms, and texts.  Overinterpretation indicates the 
consequent multiplicity of modes and levels of meaning that emerge in analyzing 
these phenomena.  Meaning is, in principle, uncontrollable and open-ended.  This 
open-endedness is the product both of an inherent pluralization within language 
and symbols (as expressed in Paul Ricoeur’s emphasis on polysemy), and of the 
proliferation of meaning in relation to contexts and viewpoints (as in Jacques 
Derrida’s dissemination).  Derrida summarizes the latter thus:  
“dissemination…can be led back neither to a present of simple origin nor of an 
eschatological presence….It marks an irreducible and generative multiplicity.”39   
The use of a term which originates from a “generative multiplicity” yet which achieves 
consensus and circulation implies a semantic energetics, that is a momentum of “will to 
negotiate-compromise-accept-concede” to a usable meaning from a polysemic set of 
possible meanings.   
To summarize the excess of linguistic consensus or contract, the “inherent 
pluralization within language” refers to our assertion of the linguistic and energetic 
excess of the semantic condition.  As noted in our introductory etymological survey, 
linguistic terms have multiple possible definitions and uses in language, the term’s 
definition is itself dependent upon other terms with their own multiple possible 
definitions, and most vitally as Deleuze instructs, the conjunction of terms requires and 
already assumes will, differentiating potentiation, and value.  Moreover, in the culture of 
discourse, speakers carry to the term their own unique linguistic bias and background, the 
multiplicity of which constitutes a linguistic yet overdetermined consensus.  Multiple 
possible definitions and uses of terms and multiple possible speakers who approach the 
term with their own version of the nativity of the language mark the observable 
                                                            
39 James DiCenso, The Other Freud – religion, culture and psychoanalysis, London & New York:  Routledge, 1999, 8; 
DiCenso is quoting Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass, Chicago:  U. of Chicago Press, 1981, 45. 
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plurivocal nature of the linguistic excess.  Speaking, communicating in text, are 
contractualized functions, but it is entirely unclear how this contract is “written.”  That is, 
this plurivocal condition itself implies the insinuation of an extra-linguistic will working 
in the contractual process:  intrinsic and extrinsic negotiation and compromise of the 
definition of terms inheres in the contractual process of language and constitutes the 
energetic condition of its excess, an excess economic.           
Circulating:  Likewise, the “circulating” condition of the semantic excess implies 
both a linguistic excess and an extra-linguistic momentum.  That is, once agreed upon in 
contract, words become circulated, moving in repetition between speakers.  The 
hypothetical contractual negotiation, whether explicitly and scholastically labored or 
informally and implicitly agreed upon, tends to become more implicitly defined in the 
repetition of the terms of language:  in the habituated use of a term that term tends to 
achieve a non- or less-than-negotiated status, that is it tends toward a “literal” or 
literalized usage.   
Likewise, this linguistic achievement is not attained without a non-linguistic or 
extra-linguistic momentum, that is the simple repetition of the term constitutes an 
energetic momentum which tends to pressure the non- or less-than-fully reflective (hence 
habitual) literality of the term’s use in language.  Freud’s re-discovery of the “speaking 
cure” insighted that the determination and overdetermination of the possible terms of 
language are never absent psychic force.  
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 Summary of the Semantic Excess:  The semantic or “literal” use of language 
speaks from a set of possible multiplicities of definition of terms; the indefinite 
referability of the definition of terms by other terms of language infers further 
complication of any pure semantic meaning; all implicate the condition of undecidability 
of the semantic and as such constitute a linguistic semantic excess.  Moreover, the 
contractual and circulated condition of semantic language terms, as willful agreement and 
repetitive usage between speakers, appears to be not fully accountable without a non-
linguistic40 or extra-linguistic momentum, that is an implied psychic-energetic status of 
the semantic.  The semantic persists in a condition of excess, both linguistic and extra-
linguistic.41  We can note a native heteroglossia 42 to the semantic field.       
                                                            
40 Even Kant alludes to this extra-linguistic status of language when, in the Prolegomena he admits (my emphasis in 
italics):  
“To search in our common knowledge for the concepts which do not rest upon particular experience and yet 
occur in all knowledge from experience, of which they as it were constitute the mere form of connection, 
presupposes neither greater reflection nor deeper insight than to detect in a language the rules of the actual use of 
words generally and thus to collect elements for a grammar (in fact both researches are very nearly related), even 
though we are not able to give a reason why each language has just this and no other formal constitution, and still 
less why any precise number of such formal determinations in general, neither more nor less, can be found in it.” 
(Kant, Immanuel, Prolegomena, 4: 323, (Kant, Immanuel, Explanatory section of the Prolegomena to Any Future 
Metaphysic, Kants Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 4, Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin:  G. 
Reimer, 1902, 323); quoted by Surber, Jere Paul, Metacritique, ed. & trans. Jere Paul Surber, New York:  
Humanity Books, 2001, 16) 
Surber goes on to keenly observe that Kant “implicitly assumed that the categorical structure of experience is 
independent both of the various empirical ways in which this structure is articulated within experience and of the 
linguistic resources utilized by the transcendental philosopher in analyzing experience.”  Kant’s general avoidance of 
the problem of language is problematic for the full expression of his critical philosophy.  
41 We will develop this “extra-linguistic” concept as a linguistic economic further forward; Derrida refers to it as 
“economic condensation” in Positions, trans. Alan Bass, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971, 40; see Gasché, 
Rodolphe, The Tain of the Mirror, Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection, Cambridge, Massachusetts:  Harvard 
University Press, 1986, pp. 184-185. 
42 “It is necessary that heteroglossia wash over a culture’s awareness of itself and its language, penetrate to its core, 
relativize the primary language system underlying its ideology and literature and deprive it of its naïve absence of 
conflict.”  (Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination:  Four Essays, ed. Michael Holquist, Austin:  University of 
Texas Press, 1981, 368; quoted by Charles Winquist, The Surface of the Deep, Aurora, Colorado:  The Davies Group 
Publishers, 2001, 130) 
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Excess of the Semiotic Field 
We call any specific formalization of expression a regime of signs, at least when the 
expression is linguistic.  A regime of signs constitutes a semiotic system.  But it appears difficult 
to analyze semiotic systems in themselves:  there is always a form of content that is 
simultaneously inseparable from and independent of the form of expression, and the two forms 
pertain to assemblages that are not principally linguistic.43  
A concept of the “semiotic field” is much more difficult for us to gain hold of for 
it tends to inhere in the semantic field as both a “regime of signs” but also, by its 
definition, as symptom, as Derrida’s trace – that is, if linguistic syntax courses in the 
metered foot of speech, then the semiotic traces its footprint in the shifting sands and 
flows or momentums of meaning registers.  A linguistic naiveté is ruptured by 
indecisiveness in the core of the linguistic and extra-linguistic exchanges of meaning.   
Our analysis of this complexity will proceed on two tracks.  First, from a more or 
less conventional angle of the contracted/circulated definition of the term semiotic 
(similar to the Deleuze/Guattari first usage above, as a “regime of signs”).  Next, because 
we claim that the contracted/circulated definition may in fact be inadequate in tracking a 
more or less complete map of this regime or register of the semiotic, we will therefore 
consider a meta-analysis of the semantic and semiotic fields which addresses that which 
appears “inseparable from and independent of the form of expression [which] pertain to 
assemblages that are not principally linguistic.”   
Our first track works from the “conventional” definition of semiotic.  The OED notes 
two lines of reference, while the Collins English Dictionary expands to three:   
                                                            
43 Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, A Thousand Plateaus, Capitalism & Schizophrenia, trans. 
Brian Massumi, New York:  Continuum, 2004, 123. 
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semiotic, semeiotic adj. 
1. Relating to symptoms. 
2. Symbolic, serving to convey meaning.44  
 
1. (Linguistics) relating to signs and symbols, esp. spoken or written signs 
2. (Linguistics) relating to semiotics 
3. (Medicine) of, relating to, or resembling the symptoms of disease; 
symptomatic  
[from Greek sēmeiōtikos taking note of signs, from sēmeion a sign]45 
 
Semiotics references two broad areas of study similar to the Deleuze-Guattari 
formula: 
 1. (Linguistics) the study of signs and symbols, esp. the relations between 
written or spoken signs and their referents in the physical world or the world of 
ideas.) 
2. (Medicine) the scientific study of the symptoms of disease; symptomatology; 
also called semiology semeiology.46 
For our purposes, the first semiotic register relates to the study of linguistic meaning, that 
is, the use of signs to originate, contract, and then circulate conventional systems of 
communication such as:  “The cat chases the mouse,” “Herd the mammoths into the blind 
canyon and then we hunt them from the cliff by the large boulder…”  These examples of 
course involves the technical examination of codes and how they can isolate, convene, 
and then convey specific meaning in communication systems.  Umberto Eco renders a 
specific and perhaps useful set of definitions: 
Semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign.  A sign is 
everything which can be taken as significantly substituting for something else.  This 
something else does not necessarily have to exist or to actually be somewhere at the 
moment in which a sign stands for it.   
…semiotics studies all cultural process as processes of communication.  
                                                            
44 OED. 
45 freedictionary.com:  Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged. 
46 Ibid. 
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 …This process is made possible by the existence of a code.   
A code is a system of signification.  …When – on the basis of an underlying rule 
– something actually presented to the perception of the addressee stands for 
something else, there is signification.   
…A signification system is an autonomous semiotic construct that has an abstract 
mode of existence independent of any possible communicative act it makes possible.  
On the contrary (except for stimulation processes) every act of communication to or 
between human beings – or any other intelligent biological or mechanical apparatus – 
presupposes a signification system as its necessary condition.47 
Eco appears to articulate the first set of definitions which pertain to “…the 
semiotic…semiotics” as the study of signs, and specifically the study of code systems 
which facilitate human communication.  Eco’s principles thus follow: 
a. “Semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign” and 
“a sign is everything which can be taken as significantly substituting for 
something else…” [my emphasis] asserts that the semiotic register pertains 
to the representation and/or substitution of subjective objects of reference 
to code systems:  for example, a “tall organic structure” within my view or 
touch can be coded to its sign reference “tree.” 
b. The “substitution” of the object for the sign appears to be a virtual process.  
The code process holds independently in addition to or separate from the 
actual object/sign structure, i.e., “…This something else does not 
necessarily have to exist… A signification system is an autonomous 
semiotic construct that has an abstract mode of existence independent of 
any possible communicative act it makes possible.”  The representation or 
                                                            
47 Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, Bloomington Indiana:  Indiana University Press, 1976 (1979 Midland Book 
edition), pp. 7-9. 
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substitution holds independently, and hypothetically can thus be used in 
this virtual condition to construct a valid, usable, or accepted 
representation or contra-wise to construct a “lie” or misrepresentation or 
mis-substitution.   
c. Eco will reference further on the necessary validation of a “correct” 
“semiotic convention,” i.e., “…when this association is culturally 
recognized and systematically coded…There is a sign every time a human 
group decides to use and to recognize something as the vehicle of 
something else.”48  This principle coincides with Deleuze-Guattari’s 
reference to contracted and then circulated words as signs. 
d. Eco also stipulates that “…semiotics…the semiotic” as sign or code 
systems are “necessary conditions.”  This principle is less empirically 
obvious, and appears to open the semiotic register to the question “…what 
or who…” claims this “necessary condition.” 
This very brief consideration of Eco’s Theory does not claim to be complete or 
comprehensive but rather merely heuristic for our purposes of clarifying the semantic and 
semiotic registers.  As such, we may observe that the first three principles coincide with 
what we have stipulated as the semantic register, that is systems of linguistic signs with 
more or less literal (contracted-consensual) and common usage (circulated/circulating) 
meaning and furthermore which may be subject to true or false verification.  For a 
                                                            
48 Ibid, 17. 
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consideration of the semiotic register their coincidence refers to “…relating to 
signs…esp. spoken or written signs.”  However, what remains in excess are both 
“symbols” (as distinct from signs) and “symptomatology” as the study of the “symptoms” 
of meaning.  We would claim that this initial isolation of a semiotic excess, as a further 
elaboration of the semantic excess which must express the semiotic, is not coincidental 
and that symbol and symptomatology share a common ground which relates to Eco’s 
fourth principle, the “necessary condition” of the semiotic.   
A symbol denotes a more complex meaning function than sign:  a sign can 
express a symbol but in so doing surpasses the code system in at least two ways.  First, a 
symbol, such as the “Tomb of Jesus” in Christianity or the Sacred Ka’ba of Islam can be 
expressed as semantically signified empirical objects in an accepted or consensual 
historical context – Jesus was crucified on the cross and his body entombed by witnesses, 
and the Ka’ba is an accepted holy site with empirical reference.  However, each can 
signify “something” which exceeds any empirical reference – for the Christian believer 
the tomb may signify the site where Jesus manifests as both fully mortal but with the 
resurrection also fully “divine,” while the Ka’ba “holds” and resounds as the most sacred 
site of Allah.  As such, the symbol functions as both a sign but also as a symptom of an 
extra-semantic or extra-linguistic reference, “like” Anselm’s extra-conceptual concept of 
God or Shaikh Ahmad Al-‘Alawī’s reference to “God in the veil itself.”  In this sense, a 
symbol exceeds its semantic sense  “…by virtue of the unequal parts which it subsumes 
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and draws together, but draws together as unequal parts…”49  The semantic “carries” the 
“sense” of the symbolic but the “sense of the symbolic” exceeds its semantic register.  
Secondly, while both the semantic and the semiotic require “interpretation,” semantic 
interpretation seeks what Paul Ricoeur might call a hermeneutics of suspicion (or 
minimal, specifying field), while the possible semiotic register requires Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics of expansion.  That is, semantic interpretation involves the clarification of 
the meaning of a word or proposition which may eventuate contractual agreement (or 
not) as to the “correct” or “applicable” (or not) usage or possible circulation:  if I state 
that “the cat chases the mouse” I am not referring to an elephant pursuing a semi-truck & 
trailer; and in the command to “herd the mammoths into the blind canyon” I’m not 
issuing a command to meet by the fire and drink beer.  The minimal process of semantic 
interpretation serves to determine the expressed intentional meaning of a statement.  On 
the other hand, a hermeneutics of expansion involves statements which are expressed in 
the semantic register, and therefore carry contracted/circulated meaning, yet are at the 
same time not immediately or comprehensively reducible to a simplified semantic 
register:  “God in the veil” or “that than which nothing great may be conceived” or the 
“Ka’ba as the sacred site of Allah” are statements which the Christian or the Muslim 
“understand” yet the statements exceed the immediate semantic register because the 
                                                            
49 Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, 89. 
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statement contain terms which are now functioning differently and in contrast to their 
immediate semantic expression.50  
In summary, we can observe self-critically but also empirically that our attempt to 
clarify the semantic versus the semiotic is itself symptomatic of the excesses of the 
semantic and semiotic conditions.  Therefore, in a second analysis we will pursue the 
suspicion that the excesses of the semantic and semiotic registers themselves express at 
least two additional fundamental aporias or gaps which haunt thought.  Let us initially 
designate these as symptom and background.  Symptom pertains to the second set of 
definitions of “…semiotics…the semiotic” while background addresses an operative 
ontological problem in the meaning condition.  Each are intrinsic and yet independent of 
the thought of the meaning condition, or to re-quote Deleuze and Guattari, each are 
“…simultaneously inseparable from and independent of the form of expression.” 
Symptomatology and symptom, we recall, are alternative and secondary 
definitions of “…semiotics…the semiotic.”  However, the study of symptoms, as medical 
signs, complicates any “semiology” by implicating the “body” of the image in a non- or 
extra-semantic and extra-semiotic observation.  Symptom derives from the Greek prefix 
                                                            
50 “As I see it the problem of the unity of language cannot validly be posed until a fixed status has been assigned to a 
group of expressions that share the peculiarity of designating an indirect meaning in and through a direct meaning and 
thus call for something like deciphering, i.e., an interpretation, in the precise sense of the word.  To mean something 
other than what is said – this is the symbolic function. 
…It is neither the duality of sensory sign and signification nor that of signification and thing, the latter duality 
moreover being inseparable from the former.  In a symbol the duality is added to and superimposed upon the duality of 
sensory sign and signification as a relation of meaning to meaning; it presupposes signs that already have a primary, 
literal, manifest meaning.”  (Ricoeur, Freud & Philosophy – An Essay on Interpretation, trans. by Denis Savage, New     
Haven and London:  Yale University Press, 1970, 12-13.) 
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syn- (“together”) and ptoma (“mischance”)51 but also denotes “an indication of 
disease…a casualty…that befalls one.”52  The study of semiotics  is thus akin to the study 
of mischance (as a ventured but somehow failed “bet,” and perhaps also as a mischance 
of fortune) but as well the study of casualty, wound, or injury.  The study of language 
pertains to the wound or mischance of meaning or the meaning condition.  Zizek 
approaches this conundrum via Lacan’s insight that “…the Real can be inscribed [peut 
s’inscrire] only through a deadlock of formalization”53 which is to suggest that the act of 
signification always fails the complete an exhaustive description of that which it would 
inscribe – the act of inscription formalizes by limitation in the symbolic order the 
comprehension of the totality of the so-called “real” order, and this formalization is by 
definition an always faltering attempt.54  As such, while still able to contract and circulate 
meaning, the symbolic order may also thus denote itself as a casualty of meaning:  “In 
other words, the Real cannot be inscribed, but we can inscribe this impossibility itself, we 
can locate its place:  a traumatic place which causes a series of failures55…. The symbolic 
structure must include an element which embodies its ‘stain,’ its own point of 
impossibility around which it is articulated:  in a way it is the structuring of its own 
                                                            
51 Shipley, Dictionary of Word Definitions, 347. 
52 Skeat, A Concise Etymological dictionary of the English Language, 537. 
53 Jacques Lacan, le Séminare XX-Encore, Paris, 1975, 85, quoted by Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 
New York:  Verso, 1999, 172. 
54 This principle was expressed by Kant in that the subject’s experience of the pure object, or the object “in-itself,” can 
never be fully or exhaustively perceived but rather the object is rendered to experience as the object “for-itself.” 
55 Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, pp. 172-173.  
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impossibility.”56  “That” which terms express in the meaning order is both inseparable (as 
“that” specified, de-limited “object” which is described/inscribed) from the expression 
itself and yet, paradoxically, it remains independent of the inscription by virtue of the 
very order of expression which by definition delimits and inscribes as an only partially 
and wounded inscription, and the form of expression of this paradoxical assemblage is 
the form of the symptom:   “…the paradox is that this symbolic pact, this structural 
network of relations, can establish itself only in so far as it is embodied in a totally 
contingent material element, a little-bit-of-Real which, by its sudden irruption, disrupts 
the homeostatic indifference of relations between subjects.  In other words, the imaginary 
balance changes into a symbolically structured network through a shock of the Real. 
…Why?  Because the big Other, the symbolic order, is always barré, failed, crossed-out, 
mutilated, and the contingent material element embodies this internal blockage, limit, of 
the symbolic structure.”57  We can note that the meaning condition appears to be 
expressed using contracted and circulated signs and symbols, and now also “symptoms” 
of meaning either expressed but also latent “as” or “in” meaning.  We may also discern 
that “that” which is expressed, while rendered in an apparently increasingly problematic 
mode, can use language to reference the world in a signed and/or symbolic and/or 
symptomatic order of “meaning.”     
Zizek insinuates the next semiotic category of concern in the image of “…the big 
Other.”  That is, the meaning condition can be seen to attempt to at least minimally 
                                                            
56 Ibid, 183. 
57 Ibid. 
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reference the “complete” register of meaning even if that register’s reference system is 
wounded, incomplete, and only expressed symptomatically both because of the intrinsic 
limits of its mode of apprehension but also because the field of complete reference is 
itself never comprehensively commensurable.  Even if physics might theoretically 
extrapolate a “Big Bang” at the “inception” of the “universe,” these terms themselves 
radically resist definition and in fact assign Zizek’s pathology of meaning:  to assign the 
word “universe” as a reference to the complete, exhaustive data set of possible physical 
reference is already to introduce a finite de-fined designation to the apparently indefinite 
data set of possible universe(s) – yet from both the minimal empirical study even a @14 
billion year old “universe” is a finite assumption (and may not in fact “be” very old at 
all).  From another angle, a maximal theoretical study is confounded by the non-empirical 
conundrum “Why or how is there or was there ever something rather than nothing, ever, 
at all…?”  Such a register must reference the complete set of signified objects and their 
possible (or impossible) complete expression.  But it is just this effort to signify the 
incommensurable which shadows thought and the hope or expectation of expressing its 
background complete set, abstractly stated as Lonergan’s “…complete set of answers to 
the complete set of questions.”  To “complete” such a wounded, incomplete reference to 
the dream of a complete meaning register, we can observe, if only abstractly, that the 
semantic and semiotic foregrounds of expression are apparently always held or contrasted 
in abeyance against an implied complete background.  This background is active and 
effective in both the semantic and the semiotic dimensions of the register.  When the sign 
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or symbol “▲” for “delta” or difference is inscribed on the blackboard what we perceive 
is (a) the data-set of “▲” and (b) the complete data-set of “▲” against its indefinite and 
comprehensive background, that is the complete set of “▲” and “not-▲.”  The shift from 
(a) to (b) abstractly inscribes the wound of the symptom because the form of expression 
of the equation has already scarred and mutilated the possibility of the complete and true 
image:  the image itself is already, in its inscription, a “new” foreground with its own 
“new” background.  Pure difference “▲” is inscribed inseparably but only in an already 
“next” repetition which thus renders its sign as symptom in repetition and its “essence” 
independent of this symptomatic image.  Winquist describes Lonergan’s equation as 
revealing the necessary condition of the “prescision of knowing”:   
Lonergan’s notion of being as the complete set of answers to the complete set of 
questions is an unrestricted notion which cannot be realized under any set of 
conditioned heuristic structures belonging to our transcendental imagination.58    
What this means is that if we decide to work toward an understanding of the being 
which manifests itself as the content of the known, then we have prescinded from the 
question of the nature of reality itself.  The notion of being which is available to 
ordinary discourse is a notion of proportionate being.  The proportion is determined 
by a structural isomorphism with the formal heuristic character of the transcendental 
imagination since these structures provide the formal principles for the unity of any 
given concrete situation.59   
 
Deleuze will express this insight as such:  “We cannot think of the condition in the image 
of the conditioned…”60 However, we must ask if this insight is functionally occluded in 
the contracting and then circulating function of terms in their forms of expressions:  the 
                                                            
58 Charles Winquist, The Transcendental Imagination, The Hague:  Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, 26-27; Winquist is 
referencing Bernhard Lonergan, Insight, A Study of Human Understanding, New York:  Philosophical Library, 1957, 
350. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 123. 
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condition of the semiotic is always conditioned and this condition presupposes, 
“prescinds” from the assumption of meaning as such.  Or to extrapolate from Winquist’s 
description of Lonergan’s abstract image, to imagine the possibility of “the full set of 
answers” is already to condition “an unrestricted” into “a conditioned heuristic structure,” 
that is, a restricted structure – this constitutes a penultimate but nonetheless asserted 
naming of an unnamable concept, as in Anselm’s “…that than which nothing greater can 
be conceived…”   
More critically, however, we note the semantic and semiotic psychology which 
surreptitiously emerges from this penult:  Winquist’s observation that “The proportion 
(the conditioned) is determined by a structural isomorphism with…formal heuristic 
character…” (my parenthetical insert) marks the subtle but intractable Rubicon where 
the apparently incommensurable statement assumes heuristic meaning and thought may 
take flight (and power) and even an undeserved dominion over “…the Big Real…the Big 
other…, etc.”  This is not an ontological observation but rather an empirical observation 
of the internal “logic” and/or “a-logic” of sense and speech which nonetheless expresses 
an assumed ontology in the structure of knowing.  Derrida appears to express this 
problem of knowing from within the code system itself, that is as intrinsic to the 
“structure” of expression itself:  “This supplement of a code which traverses its own 
field, endlessly displaces its closure, breaks its line, opens its circle, and no ontology will 
have been able to reduce it.”61   
                                                            
61 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass, Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1982, 271 
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 The perpetual displacement of the code and its supplement notwithstanding, the 
momentum of expression appears to desire its full address or accounting of the potential 
meaning condition as observed in the energetic assertion of such statements themselves, 
as we find in both Lonergan’s or Anselm’s formulas.  Winquist observes Lonergan 
further:  “Lonergan notes that our notion of being, which is itself a heuristic notion, must 
have its foundation in the dynamic orientation of the pure desire to know.”62  We observe 
both an indefinite “desire to know” but this desire perpetually encounters, and encounters 
by definition of this penultimate status rather than simply its direct failure, the indefinite 
semiotic register itself, “…the full set…” or “…that than which…”  These perpetually 
penultimate references to the extreme excess of the register are functionally intrinsic to 
the register itself:  its native status cannot avoid its equation which by definition already 
is formulated as “▲” and “all that is not ▲.”  The semiotic penult indefinitely expresses 
(semantically) its definite (conditioned, proportioned, contracted, circulated) formulation 
of the indefinite register of signification.  Moreover, Lonergan’s stipulation of the “desire 
to know” itself expresses the indefinite register, or rather, the internal energetic 
momentum which must be or desire to be commensurate to the possible indefinite 
register.  Signification thus can be expressed as the register upon which the indefinite 
desire to know definitely encounters and natively signifies the field of possible reference 
of “▲” and “all that is not ▲.”            
                                                            
62 Winquist, The Transcendental Imagination, 26, paraphrasing Lonergan, Insight, 348.      
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 Such analysis constitutes a semiotic anamnesis because we are forced to exfoliate 
the internal formula of signification itself.  Semiotic analysis is an internal “recall to 
memory” of the operative components and hypothetical structure of not only how 
signification expresses but must also account for the full “equationability” of the possible 
field of reference.  The occlusion of the full potential of both the energy and the field by 
its expression is a native fact of signification which prescinds from the sign.  We cannot 
purge this limiting fact from the equation because it constitutes the equation.  
Summary of the Excess of the Semiotic Field:  The excess of the semiotic 
condition prescinds from any formulation of the condition itself but is nonetheless 
natively stipulated in the (energetic) desire to express this internal excess both 
conditionally and unconditionally in semantic registers.  Expressions of “religion: or “the 
religious” appear to at once affirm and defy Deleuze’s observation that “We cannot think 
of the condition in the image of the conditioned…”63 because they claim to be expressing 
concerns of unconditional meaning yet within the semantic register.  We are suggesting 
that this claim is legitimated by the very assemblage of the composite semantic and 
semiotic conditions, that is “ ‘▲’ and all that is not ‘▲’ .”                       
 Freud appears to address this issue indirectly as a precept to dream interpretation 
in the principle of secondary revisioning.  That is, the dream-image functionally 
prescinds from (and hence resists) any attempt to analyze or interpret its significance 
which, however, does not prevent such secondary analysis – on the contrary, the 
                                                            
63 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 123. 
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fascination with an unconditional (more and less) dream-image captivates thought in a 
psychological momentum which is precipitated in an irresistible desire for its thought.  
As the secondary “thought” of the dream itself emerges and transverses into “heuristic 
structures” it transforms the dream-image indelibly to a signified meaning, the by-product 
of which is the functional (unavoidable) forgetfulness of the pure force of the dream-
image itself:  force is surreptitiously transversed to meaning.  Deleuze thus thrusts the 
apparent intolerability of the abstract thought-image into a concept of compossibility in 
which a recognition of the full field of thought is accepted to theory as ‘▲’ folded into 
“… and all that is not ‘▲’ ”:   
“…the very condition of “compossibility,” in a manner of reconstituting over and 
again one and the same, infinitely infinite, converging series, the World, made of 
all series, its curvature having a unique variable.  The differential relation thus 
acquires a new meaning, since it expresses the analytical extension of one series 
into another, and no more the unity of converging series that would not diverge 
in the least from each other.  Now then, infinity also changes meaning.  It 
acquires a fourth and still current dimension:  it is no longer defined either by 
itself or by the “limit” of a series, but by a law of order or continuity that 
classifies limits or transforms series into a “totality” (the presently infinite 
totality of the world, or the transfinite).”64 
 What remains is to impute the consideration of the energetic, that is the semiotic 
and now psychic energy of this compossibility as it transverses meaning and emerges 
onto the cultural field.      
Initial Observations 
Observation and analysis of the semantic and semiotic registers (the “meaning” 
register) must be, or rather, already are situated as the operational starting point of any 
                                                            
64 Deleuze, The Fold, trans. Tom Conley, Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press, 1993, 50. 
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theory of “…religion…religions…the religious” because the configuration of the 
semantic and semiotic registers prescind from their expression in signs and symptoms.  
First, more careful consideration of how “signs” and “symptoms” express appears to 
insinuate an indefinite or polysemic multiplicity to expression; second, more careful 
consideration of “expression” appears to insinuate an energetics of indefinite momentum 
or measure to the equation; and finally, any boundary “between” the semantic and 
semiotic conditions appears to stipulate a “boundary condition” itself of both liminal 
expressibility and efficient yet non-quantifiable energy.  In each of the semantic and 
semiotic conditions we observe conditional statements expressed from a register which 
appears to be both conditional and unconditional.  The composite condition appears able 
to express both conditional, contracted and circulated terms, yet also to be able to express 
unconditional portmanteau terms.  This conditionalized and extra-conditionalized nativity 
of the registers of meaning appear to render sign and symptom as compositions of an 
anterior figuration which challenges normative Western philosophical discourse and 
particularly any definable epistemological structuration of knowing or expression.  As 
Derrida poignantly suggests:   
We must let ourselves be referred to an order that no longer refers to sensibility.  
But we are not referred to intelligibility either, to an ideality not fortuitously 
associated with the objectivity of theorein or understanding.  We must be 
referred to an order, then, that resists philosophy’s founding opposition between 
the sensible and the intelligible.”65  
                                                            
65 Jaques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, trans. D. B. Allison, Evanston, Ill.:  Northwestern University Press, 1973, 
133. 
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However, we challenge Derrida’s own structuration of thought in his use of the concept 
of the “infrastructure,” expressed by Gasché that:  “…The infrastructure, consequently, 
must be thought of as preceding, in a nontemporal way, the alternative of being and 
nothingness, of presence and absence, and of the ontico-ontological difference as well, as 
Derrida shows in ‘Difference.’  If an infrastructure is to assume the explicatory status of a 
ground, it must be a radical alterity in excess of that which it accounts for. …the 
infrastructure acquires its interpretive efficiency with regard to the specific problems it 
clarifies through being in excess of the opposition of sense and non-sense, meaning and 
the absence of meaning.  …it is in a position of anteriority to the epoch of meaning and 
the loss of meaning.”66  On the contrary, we diverge from Derrida in that we will assert 
that no claim can be made that the infrastructure prescinds from a “ground” or an 
“alterity” to thought.  Rather, we claim that we can only observe thought as an infra-
symptom of its own “structure-as-symptom” which we have abstracted to the equation 
“‘▲’ and all that is not ‘▲’”; nor do we require such a “ground” to observe that thought 
is a symptom of this equation.  On the other hand, what we can claim is that discursive 
thought which derives from this equation “ ‘▲’ and all that is not ‘▲’ ” bears an 
energetic which exceeds thought not as structural alterity but rather as the infra-economic 
of meaning.  The semantic and semiotic registers of meaning should always appear 
inefficient in its semantic expression because its energetic flow should always exceed 
such expression, but this difference makes all the difference as we examine the excessive 
                                                            
66 Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror, 148. 
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expressions of culture and particularly religious culture.  Whether the study of culture, 
and in particular religious studies, is fully cognizant of this difference at this stage of its 
unfolding remains in question.  As such, what is termed “alterity” is rather a perpetual 
alternativity of the register of meaning.  
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Etymological Concern:  Contracted and Circulated Terms              
Analysis thereby encounters its meta-analysis in the first, second and third terms 
of “religio,” that is as the third term “…bounded by or to…” invades the terms “rite” and 
“ritual” and appears then to levy a complex force upon the etymological figuration of our 
hypothetical equation:  any linguistic analysis occurs in the context of language and 
hence must be, self-critically, a meta-method.67  On the one hand, we can connect 
“bounded” to “text” and “rite”:  the religious participant is “bound to…or by…” a “text” 
or a “rite” in careful and ritualized practice.  Yet on the other hand, the equation is 
incomplete without a reference to “what” the text or rite is bound.  
Nonetheless, in their etymological survey, as we referenced earlier, both Smith 
and Raschke are noting the originating problematic of our study in the initial definition of 
the named field of study itself.  And, from our introductory summary, we noted what we 
termed the “counter-valenced” or “heterogeneous” levels of the inquiry’s own terms in 
the formula.     
We also noted that, absent a more complete accounting of the semantic and 
semiotic meaning registers, we are challenged to discover Deleuze’s disjunctive condition 
in the term “religion…religious…” as rooted in ligare.  From Deleuze’s angle, it would 
                                                            
67 Meta here is used to point to the internal complexity of the problem of language whenever an attempt occurs to 
critique language.  For example, Surber, in Metacritique, observes of the metakrikker that “…we can say that 
Metakritik begins by asserting a “linguistic a priori” as more fundamental than and the ultimate condition for any 
subsequent assertion of a “conceptual” or “categorical a priori” of the sort advocated by Kantian 
transcendentalism.”(Jere Surber, Metacritique, 13)  The trajectory of our thesis is rather to assert that the meta-
conditionality of the problem of language is a function of the internal semantic and semiotic condition which, following 
Deleuze’s critique, does not posit a new a priori but rather works from the empirical observation of the multiple and 
complex situation intrinsic to language’s “states of affairs” but more precisely to the states of affairs which arise when 
the terms of language critique and analyze their own condition.    
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appear that our analysis is still hunting within the contracting or circulating conditions of 
the term:  “religion,” as a contracting word, may appear to “perform a synthesis of 
succession over a single series” in that “rite” and “text” can “bind” the religious 
participant to a set of careful practices and as such “…extract from them their composite 
sense (“connection”); in a similar vein, “religion” as a circulating word can “…perform a 
synthesis of coexistence and coordination between two heterogeneous series…” and as 
such function to form a “conjunction” of terms.  As a “contracted” term, “religion” can 
be assigned a heuristic value which sites it in relation to the valences of the semantic 
arrangement.  Here too, as a “circulated” term, “religion” can be assigned a heuristic 
value which by definition allows it to perform a synthetic function of coordination 
between heterogeneous series – in both cases, the complexity appears to be contained 
“semantically” in pre-given arrangements and pre-determined circulated structures of 
signification. 
The contracted and circulated characteristics of language usage notwithstanding, 
there appears to be another, or rather, an alter-native character to these same 
contracted/circulated terms which exceed the register.  This excess is not merely an 
etymological complex which may or may not achieve contract or circulation (usable 
validity) but rather this excess appears to “stem” internally from terms and propositions 
such as “…that than which…” or “…seeing in the veil itself…” or “…the full set of 
answers…” or even “…why is there something…” using contractible and circulatable 
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terminologies.  Or less abstractly, within our equation of religio, how can (if it can) our 
discipline contract and circulate the third term religio or ligare in an academic register?             
 Can we anticipate that Deleuze’s “contracted” and “circulating” fields pertain to 
the discourse which has tended to evolve into the “academic” study of religion or 
“religious studies” in recent decades since the American academy’s early formulation (if 
it was ever formally formulated) of its “vision” or version of the discipline in the 1960’s-
1970’s?  Further inquiry should question whether these fields of discourse have 
dominated at the expense of the “disjunctive” or “portmanteau” voices of the “religious” 
or, what Raschke will, in less or more measured rebellion, stipulate as the “dialogical 
turn.”68  This turn, as we are observing in our examination, cannot be stipulated in the 
first two terms of the formula – our examination’s thesis asserts therefore that “it” 
exceeds as the “third term” by contracted/circulated definition from within as an internal 
alter-native of the register itself.  Etymological confusion or complexity of the contracted 
or circulated use of language cannot account for its own repetitive internal excess but this 
ironically and paradoxically does not allow our extrication from the contracted and 
circulated contextability of thinking by projecting semi-contracted or semi-circulated 
“externalized alterities” – the problem of language is rather domiciled in the alter-native 
                                                            
68 “…the “end of theology” implies a Copernican revolution in a provisional sense of the word with regard to language.  
“Overcoming metaphysics” involves more than “thinking the unthought” (Heidegger), or outgrowing 
representationalism (Derrida), or rediscovering immanence (Deleuze).  At its very core postmodernism is a theory of 
language, and these particular philosophical theories serve mainly as critiques of the covert Aristotelianism that has 
crept into philosophy in almost every generation.  In that respect the “post-“ in postmodernism marks little more than 
the disruption of, or transition beyond, what has gone before.  …If the last stage of philosophical modernism was the 
“linguistic turn that spanned a sizable portion of the twentieth century, then we are on the verge of something 
unprecedented, and perhaps unwarranted, in the legacy of philsophico-theological thinking.  We are witnessing the 
markings of what we shall call the dialogical turn.”  (Carl Raschke, The Next Reformation, Grand Rapids Michigan:  
Baker Publishing Group, 2004, 211-212.)  
  
55 
 
turn within language itself and everything we can hope to have or use as reference hides 
or evanesces in the veil itself.  Nietzsche’s or Western culture’s eternal return speaks 
rather as an internal turning.                
Smith pressures this point from within the discourse itself in a manner which is 
helpful for our critique.  He observes that American religious studies scholars have 
resisted a self-awareness and a cognizance the “religion(s)…the religious” and he notes: 
“Religion” is not a native category…it is a category imposed from the outside on 
some aspect of the native culture…” 
“…there is an implicit universality.  “Religion” is thought to be a ubiquitous 
human phenomenon.” 
“In constructing the second-order, generic category “religion,” its characteristics 
are those that appear natural to the other.  In these quotations this familiarity is 
signaled by the phrases “knowledge of god” and “religion…as we understand it.” 
“Religion” is an anthropological not a theological category.”69  
Indeed, in an earlier work, Imagining Religion, Smith further asserts that 
“Religion is solely the creation of the scholar’s study.  It is created for the scholar’s 
analytic purposes by his imaginative acts of comparison and generalization.  Religion has 
no independent existence apart from the academy.  For this reason, the student of 
religion, and most particularly the historian of religion, must be relentlessly self-
conscious.  Indeed, this self-consciousness constitutes his primary expertise, his foremost 
object of study.”70 
 Smith is thus addressing the crux of the problematic:  “religious” studies has first 
contracted and then circulated a discipline which both explicitly and implicitly imposes 
                                                            
69 Jonathan Z. Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious,” 269. 
70 Jonathan Z. Smith, Imaging Religion, Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1982, xi. 
 
  
56 
 
these first conditions of discourse, the contracted and the circulated, to frame (if not 
circumvent) the third term, the disjunctive, which, ironically, remains the surreptitious 
background condition of the “religion…the religious…”  This strategy would appear to 
be an academic strategy on its surface aided, perhaps not fully intentionally, by a 
semantic and semiotic strategy in its depth.  Can we suggest that the study of 
“religion…the religious…” has tended to marginalize its own unique capacity to express 
a disjunctive third term of its register?   
 Religious studies remains a viable discipline as such, that is, to continue with 
Smith’s approach, an academic discipline.  Our discovery simply reminds the academy 
that such a discipline engenders its own incompletion without the third term.  In Smith’s 
own observation:  "I have come to believe that a prime object for the historian of religion 
ought to be the theological tradition, taking the term in the widest sense."71  
Non-Etymological Concern:  The energetic disjunctive background 
The internal remainder, Deleuze’s portmanteau term, addresses the symptomatic 
condition of meaning veiled within and upon the semantic surface condition of discourse:  
meaning is only expressed in discourse. 
The register of “…religion(s)…the religious…” may be both a contentious 
objective of empirical research and explication, and therefore a discussion possible within 
Kant’s categories or his self-limiting paradigm of reason, yet ironically and paradoxically 
this empirical method is not complete without referability to that which is the exception 
                                                            
71 Ibid, 43. 
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to reason, the portmanteau expression, “…bound…bounded…boundedness…”, that is, to 
empirical inclusion in the discipline’s progression to statements of indefinite reference 
such as Anselm’s “…that than which nothing greater can be conceived…”  We will 
stipulate, however, that this internal exception is not merely the status of an extra-
curricular theology or an attempted but limited discipline of internally externalized so-
called “alterity,” but is rather the insinuated condition of reason itself, reason “fully” 
(“full” as indefinitely iterated and extended) accounted, reason whose momentum desires 
a full accountability of itself.  Therefore, the Kantian grenzbegriff cannot be a “borderline 
concept” external to the reach of reason, but is rather the internalizing exception to 
reason itself, it is the alter-native condition of the equation of reason upon which the 
empirical study of religion in particular, and reason in general, is predicated.72  This turn 
points to the internal return and completion of the Kantian project to its alter-native 
expression:  it will insinuate faith or desire as requisite for reason rather than merely 
Kant’s own alter-native, i.e., reason critiqued in order to “make room for faith.”  The 
modern/post-modern shift is revisionable as an internal turn of the semantic and semiotic 
registers. 
Religious studies remains incomplete and unviable without the third term which 
speaks as its ghost “background,” its veiled boundedness.  If discourse constitutes a 
                                                            
72 “The “state of exception” is more than a political concept, or perhaps even a “politico-theological one,” as Schmidt 
envisioned it.  Schmidt himself referred to it as a “borderline concept” (Grenzbegriff).  Schmidt, to be sure, was 
employing the German term in a quite different sense from Kant, who in the Critique of Pure Reason characterized the 
Grenzbegriff as an idea that marks the limit of our understanding and of our rational faculties.  “God” and 
“immortality” are well-known Kantian examples of Grenzbegriffe.  For Kant in his political philosophy as well as his 
ethics all the various iterations of “borderline,” “limiting”, or what he elsewhere terms “heuristic” notions function 
exclusively to provide some logical justification for the use of terms and categories that cannot be captured within the 
net of empirical induction.”  (Raschke, Schmidt’s State of Exception, unpublished manuscript, 4.) 
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primary via regias of the discipline, then the semantic and semiotic registers are 
empirically (as the semantic evidence reveals) and emphatically (as the psychic force of 
expression evidences) a theological discipline whether it self-critically achieves this 
recognition or not:  “…Called or not called God will be there… .”  However, in calling 
and naming “religion…the religious…” have we not already addressed this internal 
conundrum, but more obviously have we not already been addressed?  It is a curious 
footnote that the emerging discipline of what might be termed “philosophical 
psychology” in the works of James Hillman and others stipulates a psychological maxim 
to philosophical discourse in the term “…stick to the image…”73 whether analysis focuses 
on the image of the dream or, in this case, the complete image of thought.  As such, the 
examination remains only provisional, i.e., “pivoting” or turning at this 
juncture/disjuncture, and we therefore require additional conceptual strategies with which 
to discuss the register of “…religion…religions…the religious…” 
Finally, our treatment of the semantic register as distinct from the semiotic 
register has, we believe, discovered an internalizing complexity and disjunction.  These 
terms, while useful in themselves in the contractual and circulating senses, cannot 
however be mapped to separate topographies but rather find themselves domiciled in an 
internal, overlapping complexity in the homeland of the meaning condition itself.  The 
attempt to clearly and lucidly distinguish them appears to be a symptom of the categorical 
                                                            
73 Hillman of course describes his work as “archetypal psychology” but indeed he himself is a very careful and lucid 
philosopher in the sense that our study here would describe the field.  See James Hillman, Revisioning Psychology and 
other works.  
 
  
59 
 
imperative itself which, again, while useful, remains a sub-set of the full equation of 
reason on the one hand and yet a not merely potentially dangerous instigator of 
intellectual hegemony on the other.  Such hegemony, ironically, reveals discourse as 
symptomatic and the momentum of the semantic and semiotic registers as energetic or, to 
recall Nietzsche’s expression, as the will to power.  The terms semantic and semiotic 
refer to and cross-reference the register of meaning as a complexity.          
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IV. Conceptual Strategies 
“The beautiful in nature is a question of the form of an object, and consists in limitation, 
whereas the sublime is to be found in an object even devoid of form, so far as it 
immediately involves, or else by its presence provokes a representation of unlimitedness, 
yet with a super-added thought of its totality.”74  
Our discipline demands a revisioned and unique conceptual complexity in the arts 
and sciences because both this domain and our ability to account for the capacity of our 
study remain incomplete and penultimate without strategies which approximate the 
empirical topography of our observable data-sets. Just as the disjunctive portmanteau 
statement is expressed in contracted, circulated terms and hence achieves an internal 
empirical reference in discourse, the “…bounded to…by…” stakes claim to its empirical 
position in the complexity of what we think we can mean by “…religion…religions…the 
religious…” as an academic pursuit.      
 The “Prescision” from Sense and Difference 
 We suspect an arrangement to the thought of sense which already “prescinds” 
from both thought and what we have nominated as “sense.”  Indeed, we might speculate 
that sense itself appears to be a function of precision itself.  That is, the verb transitive 
“prescind” refers to the act “to separate or divide in thought; consider individually,” and 
the verb intransitive “to withdraw one's attention.”75  Sense is always “sense of…” “this” 
or “that” or “this in contrast to this other this or that…”, and so on.   
                                                            
74 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, Part 1, 90. 
75 The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin 
Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. 
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Before its nomination in the term “sense,” sense is already itself prescinding 
“from,” that is it is transitively “separating, dividing…” the surface of the field in the 
subject of sense to the object of sense.  “Subject” and “object” are already linguistic 
“terms” used to nominate the sub-sets of sense.  Or intransitively, this passive sense can 
also be seen to “draw” focus to the object as it “withdraws” attention to all that is not the 
object, or the implied complete background of the object.  It appears we must assume that 
prescision is not an operation of thought before it is an operation of sense, even if 
nominated as an operation of sense by a term of thought.  Sense both pre-forms and also 
per-forms its operation as the differentiating function of the encounter of a nominated 
“subject” with the nominated “object.”  Prescision thus stipulates at least two 
characteristics for our theory:  first, what we term “sense” is already pre- or “ante”-posed 
in advance by sense prescinding from the “world”; secondly, this ante-position imputes a 
momentum to the flow and folding of sense.  In the first instance, Deleuze will 
characterize this quality as the “paradox of regress, or indefinite proliferation”:    
When I designate something, I always suppose that the sense is understood, that 
it is already there.  As Bergson said, one does not proceed from sounds to images 
and from images to sense; rather one is established “from the outset” within 
sense.  Sense is like the sphere in which I am already established in order to enact 
possible denotations, and even to think their conditions.  Sense is always 
presupposed as soon as I begin to speak; I would not be able to begin without this 
presupposition.  In other words, I never state the sense of what I am saying.  But 
on the other hand, I can always take the sense of what I say as the object of 
another proposition whose sense, in turn, I cannot state.  I thus enter into the 
infinite regress of that which is presupposed.  ...This infinite proliferation of 
verbal entities is known as Frege’s paradox.76 
                                                            
76 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 28-29. 
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The second precept is hinted at here as well when the “order” of sense’s 
procession “…from sounds to images…” suggests the flow or momentum of sense.  The 
American semiotician Charles Peirce appears to be very precise about this “momentum,” 
(which we also claim suggests an energetics of sense) when he refers to the “separation” 
or “division” of sense in the condition of its prescision:      
§5.  The terms “precision” and “abstraction,” which were formerly applied to 
every kind of separation, are now limited, not merely to mental separation, but to 
that which arises from attention to one element and neglect of the other.  
Exclusive attention consists in a definite conception or supposition of one part of 
an object, without any supposition of the other.  Abstraction or precision ought to 
be carefully distinguished from two other modes of mental separation, which 
may be termed discrimination and dissociation.  Discrimination has to do merely 
with the essences of terms, and only draws a distinction in meaning.  
Dissociation is that separation which, in the absence of a constant association, is 
permitted by the law of association of images.   
…Prescision is not a reciprocal process.77 
 
Thus we impute this precept of prescision from the regress of the symptoms of a 
sense of thought which has already begun.  As Peirce theorizes, the order is not 
reciprocal because we can never achieve pure sense but only an after-sense.  Yet it 
appears that we can discern that its after-sense symptomatic expression is ironically 
reciprocating in that we achieve this “sense” of the precision of sensed thought from the 
ante-position of textual references to describe these symptoms.  And the precept of 
prescision appears to subtly suggest the “flow” of energy “from” and “to,” and though we 
cannot obtain a semantic or semiotic measure of such energy we note that it must register 
a certain efficiency of exchange, and this energetic must also be included in the total 
equation which we will call the “sense-to-sign” register. 
                                                            
77 Charles Peirce, The Essential Peirce, Peirce, Charles Sanders, The Essential Peirce Volume I, ed. Nathan Houser and 
Christian Kloesel, Bloomington, Indiana:  Indiana University Press, 1992, pp. 2-3 
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Sense to Sign:  The Requisite for a Theory of Semantic and Semiotic Economic 
Exchange 
All the sciences have from now on to prepare the way for the future task of the 
philosophers:  this task understood as the solution of the problem of value, the determination 
of the order of rank among values.78   
We are never referred to the real forces that form thought, thought itself is never related 
to the real forces that it presupposes as thought.  Truth is never related to what it presupposes.  
But there is no truth that, before being a truth, is not the bringing into effect of a sense or the 
realization of a value.  Truth, as a concept, is entirely undetermined.79 
...From denotation to manifestation, then to signification, but also from signification to 
manifestation and to denotation, we are carried along a circle, which is the circle of the 
proposition.  Whether we ought to be content with these three dimensions of the proposition, 
or whether we should add a fourth – which would be sense – is an economic or strategic 
question.80 
Culture rests precariously in the liminal boundary of the energetic momentum 
between these semantic and the semiotic registers.  This borderland renders the register as 
desiring intelligibility but only more or less stable.  Meaning has already occurred to 
itself as it would seek to analyze, and it is already carried on the momentum of the desire 
to know.  From this reverse angle, Kant’s The Critique of Pure Reason may be read as 
much as a warning as analysis – it speaks like the gorgons at the gates of castle.  We can 
discern desire, faith, and pathos as primary requisites for reason. 
Of course the gate is now a prescinded aporia – an impassable yet implied portal – 
which closes as its opens and opens as it closes in the dynamic plays and leaps from 
“desire’s” “sensibility” to its elusive and elliptical signatures in the signs of proposed 
“intelligibilities.”  What ante do we hold and then put up as we stand at the portal? 
                                                            
78 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York:  The Modern Library, 2000, 
492. 
79 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche & Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson, New York:  Columbia University Press, 1983, 
(original Nietzsche et la philosophie, Presses Universitaires de France, 1962, pp. 103-104. 
80 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 17. 
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This portal of the meaning register can also be assigned as “gap” or “gaping” – 
i.e., the subtle and immeasurable implied extent “between” sensibility (the imagined “pre-
verbal” or, in our terms, ante-verbal) and intelligibility.  Each term is already achieved 
through the assignment of signification – the inscription of the sign to de-sign-ate the 
references of experience in a signed “time” and a “space.”  That is, by assigning the 
time/space mark of the sense-to-object event to a “sign,” so-assigned “intelligible 
thought” “captures” the event in the signature of a language system: 
Signs represent the present in its absence; they take the place of the present.  
When we cannot take hold of or show the thing, let us say the present, the being-
present, when the present does not present itself, then we signify, we go through 
the detour of signs.  We take up or give signs; we make signs.81 
 
Derrida, deconstructing classical semiology from within, thus asserted that 
because the sign is a “secondary” or “provisional” substitution of the time/space 
“presence” or now deferred presence of the sense-to-object event, the sign could no 
longer be assumed to merely represent this presence or deferred presence.82  More 
critically, for a semantic and semiotic economic theory, he asserted that the “simple 
symmetrical” relationship of sign to presence was in question,83 thus raising the ante for 
any expectation that we could measure or estimate the energetic or economic force of an 
                                                            
81 Jacques Derrida, “Differance,” in Speech and Phenomena, Evanston:  Northwestern University Press, 1973, 138 
82 Ibid, “1.  Differance can no longer be understood according to the concept of “sign,” which has always been taken to 
mean the representation of a presence and has been constituted in a system (of thought or language) determined on the 
basis of an in view of presence.” 
83 Ibid, “2.  In this way we question the authority of presence or its simple symmetrical contrary, absence or lack.  We 
thus interrogate the limit that has always constrained us, that always constrains us – we who inhabit a language and a 
system of thought –to form the sense of being in general as presence or absence, in the categories of being or beingness 
(ousia).”   
  
65 
 
originary sensibility to its signature in the sign.  Derrida assigned this immeasurable and 
unnamable gap or aporia “différance”:        
 Derrida sought to radicalize the Heideggerian project by tracing the 
metaphysical privileging of presence back to the tradition’s most basic 
assumptions regarding language, signification, and textuality.  …Derrida 
introduced the signifier différance.  Identical in sound with the French 
difference, of which it at first appears in misspelling, it indicates the underlying 
process of opening or spacing that makes any concrete system of differences 
possible.  Neither active nor passive, substantial nor insubstantial, determinate 
nor indeterminate, difference is…a sort of intersection of temporality becoming 
spatialized.   Différance is neither signs nor the differences between them but a 
sort of open field of play out of which both arise.  It is covered over or 
suppressed by every concrete act of signification, but it is also their ultimate 
source and precondition, a spacing…but not a space, a temporalizing but not any 
particular temporal event, a continually receding or deferred trace of past and 
future significations in the present.84   
We suspect a “gap within the gap” in Surber’s observation that “Difference is neither 
signs nor the differences between them but a sort of open field of play of which both 
arise.”  This open field is indeed, we assert, the energetic economic field which is 
“covered over or suppressed” by the process itself – it constitutes what we stipulate as the 
leap of faith or desire between sensibility and intelligibility.  It suggests the ante of the 
bet, the energy of sense which is anteed on the betting table and then rendered and 
exchanged in the play of signification.    
Sense to Sign “Instantiation” as the Ante of Thought 
It is rather a question of a throw of the dice, of the whole sky as open space and of 
throwing as the only rule.  The singular points are on the die; the questions are the dice 
themselves; the imperative is to throw.  Ideas are the problematic combinations which 
result from throws.85 
                                                            
84 Jere Paul Surber, Culture and Critique, Denver, Colorado:  Westview Press, 1998, p. 20. 
85 Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, 198. 
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We require an additional, indeed, an excessive propaedeutic to the meaning 
equation of sensibility and intelligibility itself, and we term this a propaedeutic of the 
“ante.”   
Hegel appears to stipulate the mechanics of the semantic register as follows:   
“In Intuition we have single objects before us.  Thinking brings them into relation 
with each other or compares them.  In Comparison it singles out what they have in 
common with each other and omits that by which they differ and thus it retains only 
universal ideas.”86 
So here we may empirically observe thought’s own sly ante to the betting table:  Hegel 
assumes, or must “ante,” the semantic register (“intuition…thinking…relation… 
comparison…universal ideas”) in order to describe or account for the process of thought.  
But at Hegel’s juncture thought has already leapt (or lapsed), it is already in flight, but 
from what space or time, what throw, what bet? 
 To account for the meaning register, we must therefore ante-pose this leap “from” 
“sense” “to” “sign” – from Hegel’s “single objects” “to” “thinking…intuition…etc.” - we 
punctuate using quotation-marks to intentionally point to each term in the order of the 
ante.  That is, each sign of the ante-signature of the equation is already a bet, a “put”87 of 
any “thesis” which would assume and insinuate itself into the meaning register.  The ante 
constitutes both the sign reference and the energetic momentum which must be “put” or 
“placed” in order to begin and pre-sume the play of meaning.  To “presume” is to “take 
                                                            
86 G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophical Propaedeutic, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford:  Basil Blackwell, 1986, p. 9, section 1:  
“The Science of Laws, Morals and Religion, Elucidation,” #6; quoted by Jean-Joseph Goux, Symbolic Economies After 
Marx and Freud, trans. Jennifer Curtiss Gage, Ithaca, N.Y.:  Cornell U. Press, 1990, 41. 
87 One definition of “ante” means “to put in beside, to place”, OED. 
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possession of without any right”88 and indeed, we and/or thought possess no “right” to its 
presumption – it must simply ante the right or privilege.  No “right,” that is, other than 
the post facto consensus and contract of a now post-assigned semantic and semiotic 
figuration and energetic.   Moreover, Hegel’s “thinking” already possesses an ante-
positing of itself in order to posit itself as such – and, we might also observe, both 
“thought” and the “subject that would think” are furthermore possessed by this put – the 
anteed put already stipulates both the order and the economics (the “cost” of the bet) of 
the play of meaning.  The light of consensual meaning is always an afterglow of a 
previous positing that has already been purchased by the economics of the bet. 
 This ante applies to the “thought of difference.”  For example, if I draw “▲” on 
the blackboard the faculty of vision may see and then visually distinguish the image “▲” 
as “differentiated” against the background of the blackboard (or it may not) but what-is-
called “thought” rescinds the term “difference” until I verbally insinuate the question, 
“What do you see?”  The “what” and the “see” have already leapt from the pure event of 
seeing but this leap itself constitutes an event, the event of the energetic shift from sight 
to sound to term – the event of sight is termed in the terms of the question, and as such 
term-inates the pure vision as it is now sounded and inscribed in “its” verbal signing but 
the “it” is itself no longer the pure vision but rather a “new” event, a new instance of 
figuration.  The economics of this shift must be at least efficient, that is, the event cannot 
destroy the energy of the original sensory input but rather must shift and conserve it to a 
new state or status:  the state or status of the term is itself energetic, sensory, even 
                                                            
88 OED. 
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sensual.  Or, more likely, the event achieves an expanded economics as the mere visual 
sensory input of “▲” expands into a vastly “new” sensory topography, that of the 
indefinite field of the full language-set.89  It is “one thing” to “see” the “▲” as a pure 
visual reference/difference, but it is quite another “thing” to write the text Difference & 
Repetition. 
 However, the “shift” from “sense” to “sign” stipulates a qualitative as well as an 
energetic or quantitative change, and this difference constitutes an immeasurable part of 
the difference of the sense-to-sign ex-change, a difference which escapes “quantification” 
because it metamorphoses the arch of the event-shift to a new qualitative state.  Deleuze 
notes in his description of Leibniz’s “fold”:   
The simplest way of stating the point is by saying that to unfold is to increase, to 
grow; whereas to fold is to diminish, to reduce, “to withdraw into the recesses of 
a world.”  [Leibniz, Letter to Arnauld, April 1687 (Gph, II, 99) [Mason, 125]]  
…That is why metamorphosis or “metaschematism” pertains to more than mere 
change of dimension:  every animal is double – but as a heterogeneous or 
heteromorphic creature, just as the butterfly is folded into the caterpillar that will 
soon unfold.90 
We are employing Deleuze’s illustration of the Leibnizian “fold” to suggest that the 
instantiating shift from sense to sign, the intrinsic generative “unit” of the semantic and 
semiotic registers, constitutes both a (1) quantitative and “economic” “-crease” (both 
potentiated as in-crease but also as de-crease of energy) as sense shifts or “unfolds” to 
sign, and (2) that this quantitative shift further implies (and may hide) a qualitative shift, 
                                                            
89 Or, alter-natively, we can assert this full-set to the visual arts, or the sound-set to the musical arts, etc.  Art and music 
therefore comprise the radically expanded erotic or sensual subliminal topographies of the “full” or “fuller” set of 
vision and sound, as such.   
90 Deleuze, The Fold, 9. 
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a metamorphosis, which “generates” the sign as a “meta-schema” of sense in a process 
which  Deleuze stipulates elsewhere as the “passive genesis.”91  This liminal boundary of 
the semantic and semiotic registers cannot be fully accounted but rather subsists as an 
energetic and metaschematic symptom of any language event.          
           We stipulate this anteed move prior to the assignation of the meaning structure the 
instantiation of the shift from “sense” “to” “sign” – and the “here,” in this space and 
time, our “sense” and “sign” are of course themselves already anteed bets of the meaning 
play.  Kant’s a priori principles of space and time hold as both the “instance” or time 
reference as well as the “stance” or “standing-in” or space reference of the anteed event 
of meaning.  But “now” the instance of the sign constitutes the event of the instance of 
signification rather than pure space or time – the “play” from sense to sign instantiates its 
own singular event.  Instantiation is thus the insinuation of “sense” now stipulated as its 
“sign” “of” “meaning” – “meaning” as a “sign” “of” “a” “sense” but now captured in the 
parenthetical (etymologically, parenthesis as the “put” of the “thesis”92) complexity of 
the register.  Instantiation constitutes the flashpoint which precedes any semantic or 
semiotic originating event, a flashpoint which, however, has by definition already lapsed 
from the signature – like a flashbulb in a dark ante-room which has already flashed to 
reveal the signature of the room’s image – the glow of the image is already an after-glow.  
And while we might desire to dream Plato’s dream in the cave – the dream of the “Idea” 
                                                            
91 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 116-117. 
92 Late Latin, insertion of a letter or syllable in a word, from Greek, from parentithenai, to insert ; freedictionary.com:  
The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin 
Company. Updated in 2009. 
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expressed in the ‘idea” – the entire Platonic image of the “Idea/idea” remains itself 
already an ante-posed instantiation.  
This insight is consistent with our earlier observation that “theory” must first 
acknowledge that it begins with a self-declared approach, that it carries to the scene of the 
examination an intrinsic point of view, an already held system of values.  The approach 
and value system are expressed in their discourse and are thereby available to our 
observation, critique, and analysis – the so-called semantic or deconstructive critique.  
Yet our examination is forcing the discursive analysis beyond this semantic economic 
register to include the implication of its own ante-positioned economic register which we 
think prescinds from the formal structure.     
 For example, we can speculate that the method resident to phenomenology, so-
called “bracketing,” may itself be “read” as the attempt to gain access to this ante-
position of thought by attempting to use the “[…]” as a descriptive means of isolating the 
mind’s acquisition of the object.  Indeed, as with any philosophical approach, we can 
trace an elaborate method yet such methods are suspended in the discursive register 
already anteed and then expressed by means of this register.  In fact, we might apply the 
test of veracity to a philosophy or philosophical method by carefully examining its ability 
to accurately adhere to its original definition of itself – does it coherently describe and 
thus account for experience within the given register of its elected discourse?  Does its 
bet work?  However, our conceptualization of the ante-regimes (the semantic +/- the 
semiotic) anticipates (in arrears) the failed attempt by phenomenology to bracket and 
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thereby isolate thought or elements of thought.  That is, because the semantic and 
semiotic ante-conditions of meaning are themselves only secondarily legible as a 
parenthetical structure, phenomenological bracketing is better situated as only 
symptomatically reflecting (rather than axiomatically accessing) the already constellated 
event horizon of meaning.        
A philosophical economic could thus be imagined as the energetic efficiency of 
the method’s expression and application of its ante-position – this would imply its 
semantic economic efficient, expressed below in point #1.  Yet in point #2 we will up the 
ante to include a semiotic economic:   
1. The ante of discourse:  The discourse is always the expression of its 
semantic economic – the “ante” as its expression in language, “a” 
language, that is its intrinsic boundedness in a discursive system as, for 
example, critiqued by Derrida’s deconstructive analysis; the language 
event, on the discursive register, is read as the instantiation of the sign in 
the “space” and “time” of the text; this instantiation constitutes, moreover, 
an economic investment, an ante of energy; we will explore both aspects 
of the equation but here indicate that “investment” will bear on the “sense” 
side of the equation – what Freud stipulated as “cathectic energy,” while 
“instantiation” will bear on the sign-side of the equation.  A complete 
critique of the semantic register will reveal, however, that its economy 
cannot be fully accounted nor completed unless we allow for an energetic 
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momentum to the register:  this situation we will describe as the eccentric 
restrained loop of the semantic.     
2. The ante of semiosis:  The full accounting of the event horizon of 
meaning, what we might term the full register of the field of sensibility 
(can we “call” it “desire,” or “faith,” etc. …), cannot not implicate the 
entire sensual horizon of possible thought of which the discursive ante is 
merely an expression, minimally a sign, and maximally the sign and its 
energetic symptom; this register is subject to a radically differentiated 
semiotic economics which cannot not bear upon the discursive register nor 
itself be expressed except through the discursive register – what we will 
describe as the eccentric un-restrained loop of the semiotic.   
 
The Eccentric, Negotiated, Restrained, Valued “Semantic” Loop 
Semiotics is dealing with sign-function, but a sign-function represents the correlation of 
two functives which (outside that correlation) are not by nature semiotic.  
What remains undisputed is that pour cause a code is continuously confused with the s-
codes:  whether the code has determined the format of the s-codes or vice versa, a code 
exists because s-codes exist, and the s-codes exist because a code exists, has existed or 
has to exist.  Signification encompasses the whole of cultural life, even at the lower 
threshold of semiotics. 
A theory of codes should rather be concerned to state to what degree the super-elevation 
of connotation can be made possible; how much its overlapping of sense may produce a 
maze-like network of intertwined sign-functions; and either this maze-like situation can 
constitute the object of a semiotic structural description, or it produces a sort of 
topological knot that a theory of codes can define but cannot structurally reproduce by 
means of a finite model. 
“Semiosis explains itself by itself; this continual circularity is the normal condition of 
signification and even allows communication to use signs in order to mention things.”  
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The real problem is that every semantic unit used in order to analyze a sememe is in its 
turn a sememe to be analyzed. 93  
In these remarkable statements from A Theory of Semiotics, Umberto Eco appears 
to acknowledge the limits of a semantic and semiotic theory absent “sense,” though he 
appears to be more modestly weighting its import; rather, we would assert that the entire 
chain of signification begins (and “ends” to begin next) with “sense” / “sign-sense” / 
“sense signed” / etc., in what can only be characterized as itself a sign-sensed “eccentric” 
loop.  In our proposed configuration, the conceptualization of the composite semantic and 
semiotic register figures as Eco’s concept of semiotics “or” semiosis because we are 
claiming, as an extension or amendment of his formulas, that the semantic and semiotic 
remain inseparably and eccentrically co-implicated in discourse and that a hidden but 
fierce energetic carries their composite momentum.94  Nonetheless, what figures in these 
statements remain Eco’s sharply focused and recurring observations of the semantic 
complex which may only achieve accountability as secondary or tertiary meta-critiques, 
or a critique accounting for its own figuration with the tools provided by that figuration 
itself.  Furthermore, this emerging meta-critique cannot stipulate a new or separate 
register of “alterity” outside of the textability of the semantic or semiotic registers but 
rather can only pressure the “turn” of the equation back upon itself:  the dialogical turn of 
the semantic register exfoliates as a recurring internal alter-nativity that remains native to 
itself in discourse.     
                                                            
93 Eco,  A Theory of Semiotics,  20, 46, 57, 71, 121 respectively.  
94 Goux, Symbolic Economics, 20-21, expresses this as the “conjunction of the formal and the energetic at the root of 
symbolic investment and its laws of structuration.” 
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The shift from “sense” (homologous to Kant’s “sensibility”) to “sign” 
(homologous to Kant’s “intelligibility”) alludes to the problematic question of the origin 
or origin-ability of thought.   
Contractual signs or words constitute the consensual contract of semantic 
meaning (“con” – with and “sensus”, as agreed upon “sense” and now referred, signed 
sense).  As such, we identify two aspects of contractual words:  (1) their consensus (see 
“circulating” further forward) anticipates the imperative for the sense-to-sign leap of 
“desire/faith” or more neutrally, of “psychic energy”; (2) counter-wise, the consensus or 
agreement of meaning exfoliates Kant’s transcendental function as an already insinuated 
faculty of thought, i.e., we cannot imagine a sense-sign “consensus” without a 
transcendental function.  Yet, we must also observe that we cannot stipulate the 
transcendental function without a consensual semantic:  a semantic eccentric loop is 
required to account for the empirical structure of discourse.  That is, we discover in the 
careful exfoliation of the semantic the “already given and taken” consensus of value in 
the assignment of meaning figurations:  this discovery reveals the problem of valuation 
already indemnified and embedded in our assumption of meaning values.  The semantic 
has already been ante-posed by, indeed, predicated upon a “givenness” of meaning-value 
and moreover this semantic register implies a given if not purely measurable “economic.” 
Our arrival, indeed, our revival, at this status has occurred prior to our 
investigation and therefore the explication of a semantic of meaning will require a 
conceptualization of the meaning function which both anticipates and exceeds that 
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function itself.  An economics of the semantic is required, what Jean-Joseph Goux terms 
“…a genealogy of values…[or] the genesis of the value form.”95  Goux traces the four 
stages of his conceptualization of this genealogy, first in Marx’s theory of economic 
value and then, alternatively, in Freud’s four stages of child development:   
Marx      Freud  
Phase I:   
Elementary or accidental form of value:  Oral Stage 
 
Phase II: 
Total or extended form of value   Anal Stage 
 
Phase III: 
Generalized form of value   Phallic Stage 
 
Phase IV: 
Money for of value    Genital Stage 
 
Goux’s analysis proposes a plausible theory for the genealogy of valuation for the 
semantic register, yet curiously, it also exfoliates the suggestion of what we are 
stipulating is the requirement for a more complete economics of signification, that is as 
well a genealogy of symptomatically implied semiotic value.  In somewhat homologous 
references as Deleuze’s “contracted” and “circulated” words, Goux stipulates:  
Now these processes of replacement and trade are neither disconnected nor 
disorganized.  Repeated and systematic substitution acts to structure the world of 
exchangeable elements with reference to certain distinctive poles.  In the play of 
symptoms, equivalents, and metaphors, certain privileged elements take over 
and, in a standardized (social, universal) fashion, govern the process of 
circulation.  …In certain points of condensation, values seem to gather, 
capitalize, centralize itself, investing certain elements with a privileged 
representativeness and even with a monopoly on representativeness within the 
diverse set of which they are members.  The mysterious genesis of this privilege 
                                                            
95 Goux, Symbolic Economies, 11. 
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is effaced, leaving their monopoly absolute, absolved, exempted in their 
transcendent role as standard and measure of values.96 
 
“Processes of replacement and trade…in a standardized social-universal fashion” appear 
to be homologous to “contracted” semantic processes; “…repeated and systematic 
substitution…structure…exchangeable elements…” appears homologous to “circulated” 
words.  But then Goux curiously alludes to the play, “this drift of value objects, of 
interchangeable parts from which a hierarchy (of values) develops, a principle of order 
and subordination…”97 – as such Goux is alluding to the energetic economic shift which 
forces the event of instantiation.  He proceeds to then stipulate that this event constitutes 
a new and more energetic regime “…  which places the great (manifold and 
polymorphous) majority of “signs” (products, actions and gestures, subjects, objects) 
under the sacred command of a select few among them.”  The analysis observes the 
expansion of signed regimes to more powerful and energetic hierarchies of signification 
which precipitate two insights:  First, Goux is inserting into the equation the force of 
sense upon the sign; Second, he is asserting that the now signed-sense of “…products, 
actions and gestures, subjects, objects…” can achieve “command” and even “monopoly” 
over the now instantiated hierarchies of the sign regime.  Goux appears to be stipulating 
that this is a function of meaning which underlies the formation of, e.g., Marx’s 
monopoly capital, and which is attributable not as a new a priori structure but rather as 
the internal sense-to-sign event which precipitates first the possibility of initial 
                                                            
96 Ibid, 10. 
97 Ibid. 
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intelligibility but then the inevitability of empowered intelligibility, that is as Goux’s 
meta-sense, as intelligibility accounting for its own economic.  The four-stage process 
(either Marx’s economic or Freud’s psychodynamic) thus traces “the mysterious genesis 
of this privilege” of value which would account for the shift from “commodity- or use-
value” to “exchange-value” to “universal equivalent” (for the Freudian register the shift 
from “oral-identification” to “anal-generalized” to “phallic-singular equivalent” and 
finally to the “genital-elision of the phallus via castration to general or complete psychic 
organization”).98 
Regarding gold as an “overestimated” economic universal equivalent, Goux via 
Marx raises the eccentric loop question which reveals “the reversal, the “false 
semblance” intrinsic to gold’s “fetishistic character”:  that is, to paraphrase, “…is the 
commodity valued by a gold standard because all commodities have consensually been 
valued by gold, or conversely, have commodities come to be valued by gold simply 
because it is gold …?”99  To unpack the implication of this paradox, has gold, gold that is 
now transvalued as money, now assumed a virtual-actualized status which bears its own 
economic momentum?             
                                                            
98 Ibid, pp. 22-23. 
99 Ibid, p. 33, “Hence the reversal, the “false-semblance,” the “magic of money.”  Out of every oblivion of the genesis 
of the general equivalent form arises an overestimation of its role.  This is the “fetishistic character” or “fetishistic 
illusion” that is imprinted upon precious metals by the money form.  Likewise, in the sexual domain, according to 
Lacan, the organ that is invested with a privileged signifying function “acquires a fetishistic value.”  “What happens is, 
not that a commodity assumes the aspect of money because all other commodities universally express their values in it; 
but the converse of this, that they universally appear to express their values in it because it is money.”[Marx, Capital: A 
Critique of the Political Economy, trans. from the 4th German edition by Eden Paul and Cedar Paul, 2 vols., New York:  
E.P. Dutton, 1930, 69 (Goux’s emphasis added), 68, 69, 57; Lacan, Ecrits, 694; Marx, Capital, 68.] 
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We note for future reference for the study of religion Goux’s observation that “In 
the commercial register, we can affirm that commodities used as currency have included 
shells, salt blocks, furs, wheat, rice, livestock, mean, silver and gold in powder or ingots, 
and finally gold pieces of officially guaranteed weight and worth – a list that hardly 
differs from an inventory of perverse fixations, up to the advent of normalcy…”100 and in 
particular we want to remind ourselves of the homologous claim by Mircea Eliade that “It 
is unlikely that there is any animal or any important species of plant in the world that has 
never had a place in religion.  In the same way too, every trade, art, industry and 
technical skill either began as something holy, or has, over the years, been invested with 
religious value.”101        
This description, however, while accounting for the expression and genesis of 
value on the semantic register, nonetheless tends to exceed itself, or to require a further 
explication of the value function when Goux observes and quotes Marx’s apparent 
capitulation to the difficulty of defining a final value to the capital register:   “But, adds 
Marx, “the whole mystery of the form of values lies hidden” even in the most 
“elementary form, and its analysis is our fundamental difficulty.”102   Is Marx desiring a 
phantom a priori value, or in his eloquent semantic abstraction of das capital is he 
obscuring the eccentric semiotic loop’s alternative but omnipresent economic?  We note 
                                                            
100 Ibid, 32. 
101 Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, New York:  Meridian Books, 1965, 1. 
102 Ibid, 32, Goux is quoting  Marx, Capital, p. 29, (Goux’s emphasis added), Capital, 18. 
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this for future reference, but use it to introduce the imperative for an alter-native semiotic 
economic. 
That is, because the eccentric semantic loop occurs as a restrained consensus103 its 
value or economic force appears not to be equatable to the semantic register itself but is 
rather its consensus is only observable as emergently catalyzed.  We can merely ante-
pose in our observation that “…it is as if…” the indefinite energy and momentum of 
“sense” is “condensed” or “displaced,” to use Freud’s terms, and whose now only 
energetic “trace” is carried in the equation in the “con” of “consensus.”  Consensus infers 
an agreement of multiple and possibly differing views, opinions, stances, but also, from 
the economic side of the equation, differing weighting or energetic emphasis of the terms 
of definition.  The restrained consensus of meaning values in the semantic register 
implies the attempted “synthesis” (from a Kantian perspective, which may tend to over-
weight the instantiation of the sign) or “erasure” (from a Derridian perspective, which 
may tend to over-weight the potential erasure of difference of the sense-to-sign function) 
of difference in the resultant signatures, though Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of 
                                                            
103 We note simply that consensus requires psychological output in order to arrive at agreement, whether explicit 
agreement or graduated (via circulation) consensus achieved in the use of language terms; Freud develops the concept 
of “cathexis” and “counter-cathexis” to account for the expenditure of psychic energy required to first “cathect” or 
connect to the object of attention but then a countering, complementary cathectic energy required to be able to either 
distinguish or disconnect and thus differentiate psychic activity to other objects:  “Restraint of motor discharge (of 
action) had now become necessary, and was provided by means of the process of thought, which was developed from 
ideation.  Thought was endowed with qualities which made it possible for the mental apparatus to support increased 
tension during a delay in the process of discharge.  It is essentially an experimental way of acting, accompanied by 
displacement of smaller quantities of cathexis together with less expenditure (discharge) of them.  For this purpose 
conversion of free cathexis into “bound” cathexes was imperative, and this was brought about by means of raising the 
level of the whole cathectic process.  It is probably that thinking was originally unconscious, in so far as it rose above 
mere ideation and turned to the relations between the object-impressions, and that it became endowed with further 
qualities which were perceptible to consciousness only through its connection with the memory-traces of words.” 
(Freud, “Two Principles of Mental Functioning (1911),” in General Psychological Theory Papers on Metapsychology, 
ed. and intro. Philip Rieff, New York:  Collier Books, 1963, 24.) 
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“disjunctive synthesis”104 is likely more accurate to the equation – the “synthesis” offers 
a surface condition of agreement, while the still disjunctive sub-surface economic is more 
or less successfully suppressed (and we would suggest it is also heightened by a psychic 
energy of semantic and semiotic empowerment).  We can recall Ibrahim’s question from 
Global Theology Fall 2009:  “How can it be that five Islamic scholars, born into the same 
language, can read the same Koran and disagree so radically on its meaning?,” or 
Jonathan Z. Smith’s observation of James H. Leuba’s text Psychological Study of 
Religion regarding the internal confusion and multiplicity of the definitions of “religion” 
which Leuba notes results in “…more than fifty definitions of religion…”105  The surface 
restrained synthesis appears to be able to retain a radical (and residually psychic and 
energetic) and latent disjunctiveness.  
   Yet the force of consensus of the “meaning” of a term must itself be intrinsic to 
the question of the functionality of this ante-posed “register of sense” which now 
becomes signed as signed-sense.  The expanded theatre of sense to sign-sense achieved 
by desire’s register would not be plausible without the “force” of consensus.  That is, 
restrained or forced consensus cannot merely be observed as a conspiracy of the 
speaker(s) but also must implicate the conspiracy of an ante-posed sense itself to gain its 
now expanded and unfolding semantic sensibility.    
                                                            
104 Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus – Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, 
and Helen R. Lane, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1983, 76-78.  
105 Smith, in “Religion, Religions, Religious, 281, citing James H. Leuba’s Psychological Study of Religion, 1912, in 
King, Winston L., Introduction to Religion, New York:  Harper and Row, 1954. 
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However, we can observe that this forced consensus reveals the condition of 
instantiation as potentially unstable.  Minimally, the instantiation of the sign renders an 
“epi-genetic” and functional instability to the semantic register – i.e., its vulnerability to 
debate and deconstructive critique.  Maximally, the instantiation of the sign exposes the 
semantic register as vulnerable to not just deconstructive critique but more radically to 
the shadow of what we can speculate as the dis-instantiation of meaning registered in the 
extreme conditions of psychosis and schizophrenia on the personal level, or surfacing in, 
e.g., Sudhir Kakar’s analysis of the “…colors of violence”106 on the global cultural level.  
We contend that these “zones of instability,” as also exfoliated by Homi Bhabha’s 
“…location of culture…”107 may be accounted for by a revisioned theory of the semantic 
and semiotic registers and specifically of the instantiation and disinstantiation of the sign.  
Instantiation constitutes the potentiation of the sense to sign function and coincides with a 
structural semantic analysis; disinstantiation constitutes the de-potentiation of the sense to 
sign or sign back to sense function and coincides with the post-structural analysis; both 
are, however, emergent on the same semantic and semiotic field.  We are remanding 
thought to an ante-posed depth that prescinds from structural deconstruction, that is we 
are claiming a semantic and semiotic economics to the epistemological registers of 
thinking.      
                                                            
106 Sudhir Kakar, The Colors of Violence – Cultural Identities, Religion, and Conflict, Chicago:  U. of Chicago Press, 
1996. 
107 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, London & New York: Routledge Classics, 1994. 
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Initial summary of the eccentric loop semantic:  The semantic strange loop may 
compose a consensual, contractual foreground to the description of the meaning function, 
yet this consensus is always, by empirical observation, subject to the semantic economic 
equation from which it emerges.  Derrida’s critique, in particular, focuses on the semantic 
eccentric loop and the consequences, both intended and unintended, when a full 
accounting of this function is desired.   
Native consequence:  contracted words, by consensus, and hence circulating 
words, by their repetition in more or less consensual use, facilitate the semantic 
structure of the meaning function; the semantic field, however, is always open to 
its semantic background constituted in multiple and indefinite semantic 
definitions of discursive structures, their consequent applications and circulating 
repetitions of semantic meaning structures in this use and repetition in culture.  
Furthermore, the anticipated and therefore intended consequence of this open 
semantic field is the expectation of the open and competitive interpretive field, 
i.e., what, for example, Ricoeur stipulates as the “hermeneutic.”108  The discourse 
of “…religion(s)…the religious…” can function in this open field but is of course 
subject to the eccentric semantic loop, the open discursive field, and the 
consequent interpretive field. 
 
Alter-native consequence:  However, the eccentric semantic loop further 
exfoliates, in the particular study of “…religion(s)…the religious…” the empirical 
                                                            
108 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy. 
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omnipresence of an alternative eccentric loop background, that is Smith’s and 
Raschke’s interpretive insinuation of the third term of “religio,” or the function of 
the “boundedness…to… .”  That is, the first two terms of “religio,” “to read or re-
read…an oral or textual discourse,” and “to practice…rite or ritual,” present 
observable references for study.  Yet the unique and eccentric insinuation of 
“boundedness…to…” both in the intentionality of the first two terms and in the 
definition of the third term itself implicates, in the claim and desire of the 
academic study of religion, an eccentric loop semiotic background of symbol and 
symptom.  That is, the semiotic structure of the semantic unintentionally 
implicates an alter-native loop to possible so-called “religious” meaning when it 
self-imposes “the question of the sacred…of God or gods…etc.” by requiring 
discourse which can only be carried by portmanteau references. 
To summarize the eccentric, negotiated, restrained, valued semantic loop: 
Eccentric:  Semantic terms are already ante-posed in a contingent context of other 
terms. That is, clear and symmetric definition is always challenged by the 
requirement that a term be defined by other terms which themselves have multiple 
usages and definitions.  The “meaning” of a term is therefore rhizomically109 
embedded in language; moreover, a term is always carried to the scene of 
language by a speaker, who brings his or her own “context” of meaning. To 
                                                            
109 cf. Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 7-14. 
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reiterate Eco, “Semiosis explains itself by itself; this continual circularity is the 
normal condition” of the semantic and semiotic registers.  
Negotiated:  Terms nonetheless “achieve” definition, either in lexicons or in usage 
or in the organic inter-face of both.  This explication of “negotiation” itself 
represents a coagulation, a “coming together,” and hence a consensus, more or 
less, of negotiated terms.  I am negotiating with you the reader the accuracy of 
this accounting system and my writing and your reading enables a negotiation of 
meaning and usage.  Because of the other factors (eccentric, restrained, valued) of 
the semantic loop, this negotiation is ongoing and under constant and preferably 
diligent critique and revision. 
Restrained:  The “eccentric” and “negotiated” attributes of the semantic loop 
themselves suggest a subtle semantic and psychic economic to the semantic 
register.  That is, we must include accompanying “force” references (if only 
metaphorical) to account for the psychic energy required to perform the functions 
of consensus or negotiation.  Semantic restraint is apparent in group speech 
situations as one must restrain oneself to “listen,” to at least heuristically consider 
the other speakers’ possible alternative definitions and usages of terms.  This 
attribute must be acting systematically, if eccentrically, in the group psyche as all 
speakers listen heuristically and then participate in speech.  Or, restraint may also 
be apparent as the reader strains to grasp, comprehend, e.g., this text.  Semantic 
definition requires focus, concentration, and energy with which to discern and 
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explicate the intense foregrounding of “terms”.  Or, from an alternative angle, 
terms constitute at least provisional term-inations of the semantic/semiotic 
process – to observe from the composite of these attributes, terms achieve 
explication only in their eccentric – negotiated – restrained – and valued 
termination.  
Valued:  Negotiation and the strain/restrain of terms/terminations thus imply 
intrinsic value(s) to the semantic/semiotic register – expression proposes (and 
ante-poses) both a semantic or lexiconal meaning value(s) to a term or set of 
terms but this textual value would always be to some degree of value negotiated 
and it would always be attended by an economic or psychic value, though of 
course “both” values merge in a composite valuation.       
As such, we are asserting an economics to the semantic register which opens the 
table to both semantic deconstruction but, alternatively, to semantic disinstantiation.   
The former more or less critiques the structural and definitional variability to terms and 
meanings involved from linguistic interpretation, while the latter insinuates an economics 
of energetic or force to the sense-to-sign event.  Both must be essential to a full 
accounting of the meaning register.                
This brief deconstruction of a postulated eccentric semantic loop following 
Goux’s intriguing treatment of Marx’s materialist economic culture and Freud’s stages of 
infantile  development leaves us suspiciously exposed to the dangers of the fetish, indeed, 
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of the “fetishistic investment of the meaning structure…”110  Yet, curiously, because of 
Marx’s own frustration with the question of “value” itself, on the other edge of the sword 
we must confess that we are left expectantly desiring a fuller accountability of its genesis:  
it would appear that this lack of intelligibility expresses a more perilous event horizon, a 
background still lurking.  While Marx will endeavor to “discover the origin of the money 
form” and by implication the valuation of the general equivalent in the deconstructive 
analysis of the semantic process which ensues from the “erasure of a genesis, the 
obliteration of a history…,”111 that is to explain the origin of a general equivalent of 
ultimacy in the social-economic materiality of culture, we will attempt to claim that what 
is observed as necessary for the completion of the equation of the meaning-value of the 
general equivalent is the re-dress of the semantic analysis to an analysis of the eccentric 
semiotic loop implied internally in the eccentric semantic loop.  This second analysis 
does not make a claim of ultimacy but rather suggests that the empirical analysis of the 
semantic and semiotic registers are not completed or fully conceivable without an 
internally implicated alter-native eccentric semiotic loop.       
The Eccentric, Non-Negotiated, Unrestrained Transvalued Semiotic  Loop 
 An eccentric semiotic loop exfoliates as the internalizing alter-native implied in 
the examination of the eccentric loop semantic study of “…religion(s)…the religious…”  
This alternative eccentric field, we claim, alludes to what has at times been traditionally 
                                                            
110 Goux, Symbolic Economies, 33. 
111 Ibid. 
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symptomatized as “the theological.”  So-called religious studies is implausible, by 
definition and by its empirical evidence, without this alternative eccentric loop which 
would exfoliate the “…boundedness …to… .”  This insight is gained by the empirical 
examination of the eccentric loop semantic and our larger objective for a full 
accountability of the possible field of the meaning register.  We are therefore not 
claiming a “new” vision of “…religion…religions…the religious…” but rather we are 
proposing a re-visioning of the discipline’s approach to discourse.  
If the sense-to-sign event of meaning achieves an expanded economics as the 
mere visual sensory input of “▲” expands into a vastly “new” sensory topography, that 
of the indefinite field of the full language-set, then we have substantially increased the 
ante of the semantic and semiotic equation.  That is, we noted a native consequence of 
this subtle shift from sense to sign requires the analytical observation that the register and 
economy of sense has been expanded by engaging the sign-sense semantic register, what 
we have described as the consensual and circulated function of meaning terms.  However, 
the alter-native consequence intrinsic to the total equation stipulates that both the total 
field of sense and the total field of signed-sense discourse appear sited in internalized 
indefinite topographies.  First, so-called “sense” is always “sense of…” but “sense 
of…‘this’…‘▲’ ” which “stands-in” or in-stances in the totalizing context of  “ ‘▲’  and 
all that is ‘not-▲’ ”:  before any “sign of sense” we must observe that there is the 
equation of the differentiation of sense, difference as such.  (We note the mis-fortune of 
our already embedded ante, our “bet,” that is that “difference” is now already “termed,” 
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anteed, “not” as pure “difference” BUT difference as signed-sense ‘difference.’) Sense is 
already anteed as differentiation:  the “order” of sense is difference.  Thus “▲” figures 
the foreground of the sensed “object” differentiated in contrast to its totalizing field in 
order to sense:  again, the order of sense is difference.  Deleuze will assert that “how” 
the philosophical arts believes it can elect to posit, characterize, to describe, and to 
account for this “order of sense” makes all the “difference:” 
…thought is that moment in which determination makes itself one, by virtue of 
maintaining a unilateral and precise relation to the indeterminate.  Thought 
‘makes’ difference, but difference is monstrous.  …To rescue difference from its 
maledictory state seems, therefore, to be the project of the philosophy of 
difference.   
…Difference must leave its cave and cease to be a monster; or at least only that 
which escapes at the propitious moment must persist as a monster, that which 
constitutes only a bad encounter, a bad occasion.  At this point the expression 
‘make the difference’ changes its meaning.  It now refers to a selective test which 
must determine which differences may be inscribed within the concept in 
general, and how. 112   
That difference would express, and be expressed, as such instantiates the event of 
a sense of difference differentiating as sign but this differentiation constitutes both an 
event which in-stances the equation of an ante-position of the equation “ ‘▲’  and all that 
is ‘not-▲’ ” but in so doing changes the value of pure or ante-imaged difference itself:  
the sense to sign event transvalues difference to the differentiated meaning register.  
Deleuze’s “propitious moment” accounts for this event and demarcates the event horizon 
of meaning differentiating from the sense of difference. 
Yet we must note that the “▲” that in-stances cannot exclude its total equation, or 
“ ‘▲’  and all that is ‘not-▲’ .”  Thus “…all that is ‘not-▲’ ” stands in the now 
                                                            
112 Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, 29. 
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transvalued image as the implied background of “▲” because “▲” cannot be potentiated 
absent its background.  Furthermore, the energetic momentum of the instantiating turn 
cannot be negotiated, again, because the image “▲” cannot be potentiated absent its 
contrast in the total background set.  Thus from this ante-posed totalizing equation results 
the observed characteristics of the semiotic loop:  eccentric, non-negotiated, unrestrained, 
transvalued: 
Eccentric:  The image “ ‘▲’  and all that is ‘not-▲’ ” figures “▲” in 
contrast to “all that is ‘not-▲’ ” but we cannot measure its force nor 
qualify the attributes of the contrast because it is already given.  The 
equation antes itself as it contrasts.  The instantiating shift is therefore 
figured as now “▲” more or less contrasted to “all that is ‘not-▲’. ”  
“‘▲’  and all that is ‘not-▲’ ” cannot be figured therefore as two static 
poles but rather must be given as the horizons of possible difference as 
differentiation, or difference differentiating.  The “propitious moment” 
initiates on this horizon of the event of “ ‘▲’  and all that is ‘not-▲’ .”  
Quantitatively, the event thus projects an eccentric energy – we cannot 
fully measure or determine the economic exchange generated by the 
energy of the contrast.  (We might play or propose heuristically that the 
equation “oscillates” but this occurs after the fact of the event.)  
Qualitatively, the image results in an exchange of the contrasting 
functions’ foreground “▲” standing in and against its background “…all 
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that is ‘not-▲’ ” yet the contrasting horizons cannot be disconnected 
quantitatively nor disassociated qualitatively:  the event horizon therefore 
persists as an eccentric alter-nating differentiating equation.       
Non-negotiated:   The setting of the event has not merely already occurred 
but is already occurring as we encounter the equation.  But, alternatively, 
we could say that the equation constitutes the event horizon which 
precipitates the subject itself. The event horizon figures a fielded 
instantiation of the image(s) which we can attribute as “subjectivity” but 
any subject cannot negotiate this event horizon of “ ‘▲’  and all that is 
‘not-▲’ ” because “it” as the subject is only itself figured as a 
symptomatic figure or figuring of the equation.  Subjectivity thus 
eventuates after the fact of the event horizon and its energy and attributes 
cannot be negotiated except through secondary re-figuring and 
revisioning. 
Un-restrained:  As the alternative to the restrained semantic loop, the 
unrestrained “dimension” of the general equation (the semantic/semiotic) 
accounts for the indefinite background of “…all that is ‘not-▲’ ” 
contrasted to the restrained “▲.”  Terms such as “universe” figure this 
alternativity, as both a restrained sign of “physical being” or as the “time 
and space” of all that is purported to be, yet this restrained reference 
remains penultimate to the possibility of the indeterminate extension of 
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such a physical being in a time and space that, by ironic definition, remand 
their definition to their indeterminate background.  The event horizon 
figured by the restrained semantic and the unrestrained semiotic equation 
constitutes what could be stipulated as the grenzbegriff or boundary of 
what science can empirically conceive and is of course stated by Anselm’s 
“…that than which nothing greater can be conceived.”  “God,” as an 
analogous expression of “universe,” designates an actual intra-textual 
expression of the restrained/unrestrained semantic/semiotic:  the goal of a 
fully expressive paradigm of the semantic and semiotic would appear to 
necessitate this observation.  Indeed, the expression appears to self-assert 
from the ante-posited play of the equation.       
Transvalued:  The valuation intrinsic to consensual and circulated 
semantic terms nonetheless rests upon the alter-native potential expressed 
above in the eccentric, non-negotiated and unrestrained general equation.  
To reverse Anselm’s equation, the restrained expressions which result 
from “ ‘▲’  and all that is ‘not-▲’ ” have already transformed the 
potential of the statement from that which is seemingly inexpressible or  
incommensurable to a statement that now semantically “expresses” this 
“fact.”  This semantic configuration of the inexpressible may serve to 
account for language as symptomatic rather than merely expressive and it 
thereby addresses the “other” alternative “definition” of “semiotic” which 
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can refer to both “the study of signs” but also can refer to the “study of 
symptoms.”  Or, we might say that the sign itself carries this alternating 
symptomatic potential.  That is, the sign can be valued as a specific 
restrained figure of referred meaning but the sign can also refer to an 
ultra-sign of a non-designatable symptom.  In physical medicine, 
deciphering physical symptoms represents the art of diagnosis; for 
psychology, however, the reading of the patient’s total narrative involves 
potentiating what may be only vaguely figured (if at all) in physical and 
psychological symptoms to a diagnosis which itself may not be 
comprehensive even over a lifetime.  Freud stressed the inability to 
translate the expressions or valuation of the “un-conscious”:  even the 
term “unconscious” constitutes an ante-posed, restrained, after-the-fact 
and indeed penultimate reference to that which expresses the dream.  
Freud speaks of the indecipherable “navel” intrinsic in every dream which 
remains embedded in the dream but which resists translation:  the 
expression of the inexpressible.113   Derrida observes that in Freud’s 
                                                            
113 “By turning Freud’s hermeneutics of suspicion back on his own text, one discovers, not the transparency of self-
reflexivity, but a fault in the mirror of reflection.  …In analyzing one of his own dreams, Freud glimpses a blind spot 
that simultaneously resists and solicits interpretation.  Acknowledging what he would rather ignore, he supplements his 
narrative with a “revealing” footnote that effectively subverts his analysis.  “I had a feeling that the interpretation of 
this part of the dream was not carried far enough to make it possible to follow the whole of its concealed meaning.  If I 
had pursued my comparison between [sic] the three women, it would have taken me far afield.  There is at least one 
spot in every dream at which it is unplumbable – a navel, as it were, that is its point of contact with the unknown.”  
[Freud, Sigmund, Interpretation of Dreams, trans. James Strachey, New York:  Avon Books, 1965, 311-312]  This 
remarkable admission implies that every interpretation is incomplete because consciousness is doubled by an 
unconscious that not only is unknown but remains unknowable.  As the point of contact with the unknown, the navel of 
the dream is the trace of the unrepresentable that every representation presupposes but cannot re-present.  (Mark 
Taylor, After God, Chicago & London:  University of Chicago Press, 1998, 184.)  
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method of dream interpretation “there is never a relation of simple 
translation…” from the unconscious image to conscious expression, and 
he pressures this observation further by suggesting that “what” cannot be 
translated is “the value of presence” of the unconscious image or the 
projected, ante-posed unconscious itself.114  But this “value” cannot be 
exclusive to the “dream” or the “unconscious” but rather stipulates the 
latent boundary, but the expressed latent boundary, of the event horizon of 
the semantic/semiotic configuration of meaning itself:  all expression 
carries this embedded horizon and hence all expression potentiates 
transvaluation.  We are suggesting that the language event tends to 
transvalue but conserve the equation “ ‘▲’  and all that is ‘not-▲’ ” in the 
economics of the expression because the originary horizon of the equation 
cannot be cancelled in its expression.  This transvaluation persists as 
potential symptom in any expression.115 
Therefore, this event must be economically efficient in its psychic conservation of 
the energy of expression, that is the pre-semantic/pre-semiotic energy of sense cannot be 
lost or diminished but rather must be condensed or trans-valued to a new concentrated 
                                                            
114 Jacques Derrida, Freud and the Scene of Writing, in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass Chicago:  University 
of Chicago Press, 1978, 210-211. 
115 Deleuze alludes to this transvaluative dynamic:  “When we say that the sound becomes independent, we mean to say 
that it ceases to be a specific quality attached to bodies, a noise or a cry, and that it begins to designate qualities, 
manifest bodies, and signify subjects or predicates.  …sound takes on a conventional value inside denotation, a 
customary value in manifestation, and an artificial value in signification, only because it establishes its independence at 
the surface from the higher authority of expressivity.  The depth-surface distinction is, in every respect, primary in 
relation to the distinctions nature-convention, nature-custom, or nature-artifice.”  (Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 187.) 
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energy field, i.e., sign-sense.  However, sign-sense, while energetically condensed sense, 
nonetheless now eventuates as sense transvalued to sign-sense which also by definition 
semantically and semiotically condenses and displaces the total equation of difference.  
That is, pure ante-imaged “difference” must be both conserved in its expression but also 
continue to prescind from this expression:  deriving from the total field of “ ‘▲’  and all 
that is ‘not-▲’ ” it must express and conserve de facto that total field as it is energetically 
projected to the semantic and semiotic register which we have observed itself carries both 
a consensual and circulated registration but also conserves by condensation the total field 
by as well projecting and carrying the totalized originary field of difference.  Any 
expression (of difference) is both determinate and alter-natively in-determinate because 
the totalized semantic/semiotic register must derive from the totalized differential field.  
The alter-native consequence of the expression of difference is the requirement for a 
composite semantic/semiotic total energetic critique. 
For example, we might postulate that the “difference” between what we have 
observed as the semantic and semiotic registers could be conceptualized as a kind of 
“dialectic alterity” of thought.  Yet what we discerned is the overlap and over-gapping 
“between” the “two” (e.g., the consensual, circulated “thetic” terms up against the 
contrasted antithetic of portmanteau terms; in the equation of religion, rite and text 
“versus” the portmanteau “…bounded, boundedness.”) and while their distinction offered 
certain heuristic advantages, we found their clear difference to be problematic.  This 
insight persists in the symptoms of the differences in the terms 
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“…religion…religions…the religious…” and makes the discipline of religious studies 
uniquely vulnerable to an unrestrained or total critique.   
We may assert then that the “problem” of meaning derives from the very equation 
of difference which meaningful thought subsumes but which already and paradoxically 
prescinds from thought.  Thus Deleuze’s observation that “thought ‘makes’ difference, 
but difference is monstrous.”  Here the rather philosophically imprecise and radical 
adjective “monstrous” is left intentionally open to the reader’s thought – in the term 
“monstrous” Deleuze appears to intentionally project an excessive force to the text.  This 
includes a range of definitions which fall into five general genres of both qualitative and 
quantitative attribution:  (1) abnormal in size (qualitative); (2) abnormal in biological 
structure as in plants and animals (quantitative); (3) outrageous, atrocious, shocking 
(qualitative); (4) huge, as in a monstrous fire (quantitative); (5) of or relating to or 
resembling a monster (qualitative/quantitative).116  And from its reference in the 
thesaurus we encounter an even broader territory:    
1. outrageous, shocking, evil, horrifying, vicious, foul, cruel, infamous, intolerable, 
disgraceful, scandalous, atrocious, inhuman, diabolical, heinous…. 
outrageous good, kind, fine, decent, mild, admirable, honourable, humane, merciful 
2. huge, giant, massive, great, towering, vast, enormous, tremendous, immense, 
titanic, gigantic, mammoth, colossal, stellar (informal), prodigious, stupendous, 
gargantuan, puny… 
3. unnatural, terrible, horrible, dreadful, abnormal, obscene, horrendous, hideous, 
grotesque, gruesome, frightful, hellish, freakish, fiendish, miscreated...117 
                                                            
116  Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003.  
117 Collins Thesaurus of the English Language – Complete and Unabridged 2nd Edition. 2002 © HarperCollins 
Publishers 1995, 2002.  
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Parenthetically, we can observe that the term “monstrous” thus adjectivally injects a 
sense of overdetermined force to any subsequent derived or “determined” meaning, and 
from a literary perspective is reminiscent of God’s emphatic speech at the conclusion of 
the Book of Job. 
However, more curious than the ante-postulation of “monstrous” to the thought of 
difference is Deleuze’s assertion in the next paragraph that: “…Difference must leave its 
cave and cease to be a monster; or at least only that which escapes at the propitious 
moment must persist as a monster…  At this point the expression ‘make the difference’ 
changes its meaning.  It now refers to a selective test which must determine which 
differences may be inscribed within the concept in general, and how.”  The “propitious 
moment” constitutes the event horizon of the sense-to-sign transvaluation:  instantiated 
meaning can now be at once economically overdetermined (indeterminate) yet 
semantically and semiotically determined.  In order to critique the total equation of a 
thought or philosophy of difference the critique exposes itself to the ante-posed order of 
difference:  “…a total critique recognizes no restraints, no limits on its power, and is 
therefore necessarily insurrectional…”118  Yet such a critique is nevertheless ironically 
“already caught,” or to use Deleuze’s image of the dice-throw, “already thrown” in the 
ante-position of a thought laboring in the semantic and semiotic meaning register.  This 
eccentric economic configuration insinuates a trans-valuing loop to the register of 
thought. 
                                                            
118 Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy, Minneapolis:  U. Of Minnesota Press, 1993, 29. 
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Recognition of a concept of instantiation as the momentum of sense-to-sign 
already (its ante) includes its own interior potential for disinstantiation as the return of the 
sign to its pre-sense, but this potential itself figures as a next instantiation, i.e., its 
repetition as difference.  The efficiency of this momentum figures instantiation as a 
symptomatic event-horizon of meaning which now must be characterized as both 
energetic (economic) as well as semantic and semiotic.  Meaning is therefore both 
overwhelmed by the monstrosity of difference as sense but nonetheless expressed in the 
terms of signed-sense. 
And so we posit the question: What” constitutes the monstrosity of a thought of 
difference?  In the abstract, Job’s metaphorical depiction notwithstanding, we have 
expressed the monstrous as the equation of “ ‘▲’  and all that is ‘not-▲’ .”  This 
equation is a condensed, radically abstracted configuration of Lonergan’s “full set of 
answers” or Anselm’s “…that than which nothing greater can be conceived,” each of 
which offer examples of the extreme condensation of the ante-posed total equation of 
difference – the commensurable expression of the incommensurably inexpressible, as 
such.  In a radically cosmological “sense” we might imagine this figuration as the 
gossamer thin global surface and atmosphere, i.e., the inhabited physical “foreground,” 
differentiated against the entire potentiated universe, the extreme background.  However, 
we encounter the monstrosity of this figuration when we attempt to account for the 
“universe” as a conceivable term at all, as having a definitive space or time.  In fact, as 
we found in our discussion of the “unrestrained,” the term “universe” constitutes an 
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infinite and portmanteau term insinuated into determinate speech which both restrains the 
thought of ultimate difference but also expresses it – it constitutes the embeddedness of 
the radical indeterminate background within the register.              
We will labor the reader to these various Deleuzian quotes in order to provide an 
experiential exercise of the complexity of “terming” the problematic of any anteed 
“difference.”  And we would suggest that Deleuze’s style intentionally confronts the 
reader with the sensory and signed complexity and convolution of the register itself:  his 
title Difference and Repetition abstractly remonstrates “difference” as already embedded 
in an economics of energetic “repetition” – difference itself, though already anteed as 
“explicated” “difference,” “is” rather, again, de facto “inexplicable” or to use our 
terminology ante-explicable:  Difference, as a semantic/semiotic term, abstractly yet 
sublimely expresses the havoc and monstrosity of thought itself, but we are left with 
Deleuze’s question:  “…But does not difference as catastrophe precisely bear witness to 
an irreducible ground which continues to act under the apparent equilibrium of organic 
representation?”119      
Summary of the Eccentric Semantic / Semiotic Loops 
These alter-native (each “native” at once to meaning) surfaces of the semantic 
and semiotic register can be imagined to work within language in a fashion similar to 
Deleuze’s image of the Mobius strip in which “sense” and “sign” hold simultaneously, or 
to use Zizek’s more radical term, paralaxically. 
                                                            
119 Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, 35.  
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The semantic/semiotic parallax derives from the projection of the eccentric, 
economic, monstrous equation “ ‘▲’  and all that is ‘not-▲’ ” within the register.  
Intense strain and restraint notwithstanding, the monstrous equation defies the exclusion 
of “either” dimension to the terms and images of thought and therefore the composite 
equation is expressed either explicitly in the formal register or latently as depth 
symptoms.  The monstrous equation thus constitutes the exceptional compossibility120 to 
the full dimensionality of the semantic/semiotic register.  So as surface or semantic terms 
themselves – “two” “ante—signifieds/signifiers” which hold on a “singular” surface – the 
Mobius image of thought is both determinate or finite, a loop, yet it is infinite or 
indefinite, unending, and its image furthermore de-termines the intrinsic indeterminate 
nativity and compossibility of the register:  indeterminate because, as terms move along 
its surface it cannot be “determined” (without contractual or informal restraint) “which” 
surface of the text, the determinate or the indeterminate, is at this moment surfacing.  So 
not only can we not break open the Mobius surface but we can say that the Mobius 
surface is investigating itself – hence the eccentric semantic loop textualizes the surface 
of a more eccentric semiotic loop but their composite nativity potentiates an extreme if 
latent economics to thought.  This potential would seem to tend to persist within the sign-
                                                            
120 “The expressed world is made of differential relations and of contiguous singularities.  It is formed as a world 
precisely to the extent that the series which depend on each singularity converge with the series which depend on 
others.  This convergence defines “compossibility” as the rule of a world synthesis.  Where the series diverge, another 
world begins, incompossible with the first.  The extraordinary notion of compossibility is thus defined as a continuum 
of singularities, whereby continuity has the convergence of series as its ideational criterion….The inherence of 
predicates in the expressive monad presupposes the compossibility of the expressed world which, in turn, presupposes 
the distribution of pure singularities according to the rules of convergence and divergence.  These rules belong to a 
logic of sense and the event, and not to a logic of predication and truth.”  (Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 110-111.) 
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sense register.  The flight of aircraft into structures which symbolized secular 
semanticized economic power marked the event horizon of this latent potential and no 
doubt was expressed and announced at the propitious moment by the emergent terms 
“Allahu Akbar…”   
Careful consideration of the semantic register reveals its consensual/contractual 
and circulating status as a register of meaning on the one hand, yet as Derrida and 
Deleuze and Eco imply, can we apply the semantic register to fully account for the 
semantic register?  What we have termed the “eccentric loop” quality is similar to Kurt 
Gödel’s undecidability theorem in the mathematical register, i.e., that the principles of 
mathematics cannot be used to validate or verify mathematics.  This insight does not 
immobilize thought but rather opens our thinking to more radical possibilities of 
accountability, that is, an economics of exchange “between” these surfaces.  Thought 
now requires a conceptual framework with which to account for these empirical 
eccentricities. 
Further, we must acknowledge that what we have termed the semantic and 
semiotic registers appear to be accountable only as an inclusive composite equation, or 
what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as a “common assemblage.”121  Undoing the 
assemblage of the equation would be tantamount “…to breaking open and unfolding the 
                                                            
121 Inna Semetsky, “Semiotics,” The Deleuze Dictionary, Adrian Parr, editor, New York:  Columbia University Press, 
2005, 242. 
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Mobius strip.”122  A revisioned concept of the register arises subject to the following 
working insights: 
1. The accountability of the meaning register has brought us to the distinction 
(différance) of the semantic (contractual/consensual/circulating) foreground; the 
exfoliation of this foreground, however, further requires the assignment of an 
eccentric and overdetermined symptomatic semiotic background. 
2. Transcendentalizing principle of the semantic:  the semantic register cannot 
empirically account for itself without reference to a transcendental concept of its 
eccentric excess. 
3. Immanticizing principle of the semiotic:  the semiotic register, which would carry 
the assignment of reference to that which is in excess of the semantic register, is 
itself nonetheless language or semantic-bound.   
4. Accountability of these meaning registers has forced us to recognize an 
intrinsically implied third loop, the paralaxical loop, similar for example to the 
image of the Mobius strip, also homologous to the DNA helix.  The complete 
equation of the meaning register is constituted in the paralaxical register which, 
theoretically, may at the minimum provide a semantic register with which to 
address this possible composite equation. 
5. We can suspect that the equation of the semantic 
(contracted/consensual/circulating foreground) +/- the semiotic background may 
be intrinsically unstable.  That is, while the “surface” micro-analytic 
                                                            
122 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, 123. 
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representations of the semantic may be assigned a  consensual stability, due to the 
excessive eccentricity and economic energy of its semiotic background “depth” 
we can, along with Freud or Marx or Nietzsche, or Derrida and Deleuze, etc., 
surmise a macro-analytic always lurking, that is by the definition of a principle of 
complete accountability.  This interstitial instability may constitute the event 
horizon of the meaning equation. 
6. Finally, we must acknowledge that our request for a full accounting of the 
meaning equation has a momentum which exceeds its own register:  semantically, 
we will term this excess the “register of desire”; semiotically, however, we 
observe that this request, this desire for accountability, remains at this juncture an 
open field or horizon.     
 
The Copula & Caesura and the Exceptional Inception of Thought 
 “The caesura lies in thought itself:  with the thinking of the meaning of meaning (total 
reflection), a heterogeneous sphere of conditions must be at issue that precedes thinking 
as the thinking of meaning (determinate reflection), and the thinking as the thinking of 
being (external reflection), as well as the thinking as being (positing reflection).  It is the 
sphere of ‘pure heterogeneity’ which constitutes itself in itself as the logical 
beginning.”123  
But, once again, everything changes nature as it climbs to the surface.  And it is 
necessary to distinguish two ways whose personal identity is lost, two ways by means of 
which the contradiction is developed.  In depth, it is through infinite identity that 
contraries communicate and that the identity of each finds itself broken and divided.  This 
makes each term at once the moment and the whole; the part, the relation, and the whole; 
the self, the world, and God; the subject, the copula, and the predicate.124 
There are no simple concepts…Even the first concept, the one with which a philosophy 
“begins,” has several components, because it is not obvious that philosophy must have a 
beginning, and if it does determine one, it must combine it with a point of view or a 
                                                            
123 Werner Flach, Negation und Andersheit:  Ein Beitrag zur Problematik der Letztimplikation, Würzburg:  Ernst 
Reinhardt Verlag, 1959, 64; quoted by Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror, 88-90. 
124 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 175.  
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ground [une raison].  Not only do Descartes, Hegel, and Feuerbach not begin with the 
same concept, they do not have the same concept of beginning.125   
The inflection of the copula126 “to be” in the instantiation of the subject-predicate 
expression suggests an internal economics, the assertion of expressed force, of the 
implied equation of the term.  That is, there resides an exchange of both the implied 
correlation or relation of subject to predicate and at the same time, on the same surfacing, 
the energetic assertion of that relation or correlation.  The proposition “The leaf is 
green…” compresses the abstract semantic/semiotic equation “ ‘▲’  and all that is ‘not-
▲’ ” or “the equation of difference” to a meaningful statement.  The predicate “green” 
relates a sub-set of the term “leaf.”  The copula “is,” however, instantiates the term “leaf” 
with the term “green” as an energetic assertion:  we do not say “the leaf green” but we 
say “the leaf is green.”  The copula thus insinuates a subtle, energetic pause, the 
caesura,127 between the terms.  The proposition asserts that the “sense of leaf” correlates 
to the “sense of green” but these senses must pause energetically between the terms of the 
proposition.  The senses of “leaf” and “green” are then formally asserted to carry an 
exchangeable quantity and/or quality in the copula “is” while the subtle energetic 
caesura, the pause of sense(s), implied between the senses exchanges the energetic 
economic of the proposition.  Difference is differentiated as the economic exchange of 
                                                            
125 Deleuze, What is Philosophy?, New York:  Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 15-16. 
126 (OED, V. 1, 977)  Gram. and logic  “That part of a proposition which connects the subject and predicate; the present 
tense of the verb to be (with or without the negative) employed as a mere sign of predication.” 
127 “1. (Literature / Poetry) (in modern prosody) a pause, esp. for sense, usually near the middle of a verse line. Usual 
symbol 2. (Literature / Poetry) (in classical prosody) a break between words within a metrical foot, usually in the third 
or fourth foot of the line.”  (Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 
1994, 1998, 2000, 2003). 
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the heterology of sense(s).  The inception of the proposition derives from the heterology 
of sense.   
But before the synthesis of the object “leaf” and the quality “green” the 
heterology of sense has itself derived an originary specific “sense of leaf” against or in 
contrast to the “leaf and all that is not the leaf” or what we have called the equation of 
difference.  Likewise for the term “green”:  “Sense of green” is derived from “green and 
all that is not green” or the non-sense of “green.”  Deleuze terms this event horizon of 
sense the passive genesis:  
…We establish the two stages of the passive genesis.  First, beginning with the 
singularities-events which constitute it, sense engenders a first field (complexe) 
wherein it is actualized:  the Umwelt which organizes the singularities in circles 
of convergence; individuals which express these worlds; states of bodies; 
mixtures or aggregates of these individuals; analytic predicates which describe 
these states.  Then, a second, very different field (complexe) appears, built upon 
the first:  the Welt common to several or to all worlds; the persons who define 
this “something in common”; synthetic predicates which define these persons; 
and the classes and properties which derive from them.  Just as the first stage of 
the genesis is the work of sense, the second is the work of nonsense, which is 
always co-present to sense (aleatory point or ambiguous sign):  it is for this 
reason that the two stages, and their distinction, are necessarily founded.128 
“Thought” derives from the “pre-individual and impersonal transcendental play” 
of sense vis à vis nonsense.  The inception of thought derives from the exceptional play 
of sense, i.e., “sense of green” excepting “all that is not green.”  This exception must 
imply an energetic economics of strain and restraint as sense labors to sense “leaf” or 
“green” in contrast to “all that is not leaf…and all that is not green.”  The exception of 
sense is an energetics of restraint, yet always restraint in contrast to an unrestrained 
background, non-sense.  We cannot speak of sense without an efficiency of force or an 
                                                            
128 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 116-117.      
  
105 
 
energetics.  The inception of sense constitutes a forced exception of sense, a determined 
foreground in contrast to “its” indeterminate background.  These insights themselves 
derive not merely from “pure” or “pre-textual” sense but from and within their co-
implication in what is now sign-sense:  the inception and exception of sense expressed as 
sign-sense.  We cannot conceive of this line of the thought of sense without the surface of 
sign-sense so we are caught and surfacing on the Mobius surface of sense/sign.  “The 
exceptional inception of sense constitutes the ante-posed (in this “sense,” the signed-
sense) of sense” but this statement is not possible without the sense of the sign.  We are 
on the surface of thought only because, paradoxically, we can both sense and sign.  In 
this sense we have discovered “sign-sense.” 
 Thought cannot thus determine the heterological ground of its inception in sense, 
yet neither can sense assert a ground without the surface of heterological thought as 
sense/sign-sense.  Nonetheless, and this is a big “nonetheless,” from its exceptional 
inception in sense/sign-sense thought asserts or would force a claim to that inception in 
each term it lays down in the sense-to-sign play.  Thought nonetheless forces or energizes 
the instantiation of its terms on the semantic and semiotic registers.  We cannot 
comprehensively observe if sense energizes thought or if thought energizes sense but we 
can assert that a text is forced as an exceptional inception.  Each term constitutes itself as 
a microcosmic article and articulation of an asserted, anteed bet that the sign-sense term 
may achieve “accurate,” “useful” and indeed powerful signification in the language 
register.  There would appear to be a certain monstrosity to any thought that would assert 
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it can think at all.  Thus our thought, here, in this text, would assert that this ante-posed 
fact of thought’s monstrosity must include a radical due diligence and ongoing critique of 
itself by itself of the most derivative components to its thinking, specifically the approach 
to which we envision or must constantly re-vise thinking at all as potentiated on these 
surface(s) of the meaning register.    
These eccentric and more eccentric loops insinuate that discourse must claim an 
inception, a beginning, when, indeed, we can discern only the traces of “where” or 
“when” “it” began:  the inception of thought is, of course, its radical exception.  The 
naming of this exceptional inception is already an ante-position – we must already 
(“ante”) “pose” and “possess” and be possessed by our discourse in order to speak it:  the 
proposition(s) of thought require multiple pre-position(s) with which to pro-pose itself.  
Yet, in observing the empirical metrics of the eccentric loop equations, we acknowledge 
that “we,” as discursive subjects, are already “posed” and “possessed” by the equations 
themselves.    
This “ante-” concept, however, may illumine the complexity of the naming of this 
exceptional inception.  That is, “ante-” denotes a time/space reference, the “antenatal” or 
“anteroom”129 into which sense and sign-sense have already been positioned or 
insinuated in order to think itself as discursive thought.  Indeed, can we “say,” or, in the 
metrics of the equation, have we not already subsumed “what” is prior to thought by 
                                                            
129 1. Prior to; earlier: antenatal.  2. In front of; before: anteroom. [Latin, from ante, before; see ant- in Indo-European 
roots.  (The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton 
Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved; cf. 
thefreedictionary.com.) 
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already being shaped in the metrics of the question itself?  That is, what is thought’s 
conceivable inception?  Curiously, in language’s auto-eccentric (its abstracted sense) or 
auto-energetic (its economic sense) play with its own thought, the address of this 
“antenatal anteroom” is heard in its alter-native sense as “ante,” that is, the “ante”130 
which the player/thinker must “put up” into the betting pool before receiving a hand of 
cards – it is the “price to be paid” in order to play the game. 
We cannot fully account for this exceptional inception but this exceptional 
inception claims discourse.  A hyper-vigilance cannot arrest the radical eccentricity of 
sense/sign-sense but only “sense” and “sign-sense” “it.”  However, curiously, a hyper-
vigilance may offer to potentiate discourse as the sensed/sign-sensed and fore-grounded 
instantiation of the term or proposition; at the same time it may potentiate the more 
radical unfolding of the back-ground of thought in the disinstantiation of sense/sign-sense 
discourse as a derivative of difference.  Thus “called…” or “…not called…” “God…” 
(or any exceptional inception) “…will be (the copula/caesura of the 
proposition)…there…” holds as the event horizon of thought but this exceptionally 
incepted monstrosity makes us stutter.131 132        
                                                            
130 1. Games The stake that each poker player must put into the pool before receiving a hand or before receiving new 
cards. See Synonyms at bet.  2. A price to be paid, especially as one's share; cost.  (The American Heritage® Dictionary 
of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Published 
by Houghton Mifflin Company; thefreedictionary.com.) 
 
131 Creative stuttering is what makes language grow from the middle, like grass; it is what makes language a rhizome 
instead of a tree, what puts language in perpetual disequilibrium.  Ill Seen, Ill Said (content and expression).  Being 
well spoken has never been either the distinctive feature or the concern of great writers.  (Deleuze, Giles, “He 
Stuttered”, Gilles Deleuze Essays Critical & Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith & Michael A. Greco, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997, 111). 
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IV. Towards a Theory of Semantic/Semiotic Exchange 
Semantic Exchange 
Rowing backwardly, like Dionysus on the frog pond, we observed that the 
proposition “The leaf is green…” instances the sense of “leaf” and sense of “green” in 
the disjunctive copula/caesura arrangement and that this arrangement sites the proposition 
as one sensory field (the object leaf) in contrast to an alternative sensory field (the quality 
green).  The semantic arrangement derives both an abstraction of difference (object to 
named object “leaf” contrasted with the shade of the object to color “green”) as well as 
the energetic assertion of the verb “is.”  Thus we note both a discursive or nominal 
exchange of terms as well as the energetic exchange which pro-poses the terms as alter-
natives of their proposition.  We must contractually agree upon the validity of the 
proposition before it is accepted and circulated in “common” parlance.   
We can further observe the fixation of meaning by contract/consensus/circulation.  
The anteed investment which pro-poses the terms “leaf” and “green” and “is” represent 
the semantic instantiation of the “sense of…leaf…green…is…” from their sense to now 
their sign-sense.  Theoretically, this proposal generates the intelligibility we call the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
132 …One of the most fascinating symbols of the absolute is Saccidānanda, a cumulative name with a dynamic 
movement which takes you from reality (sad) to reality’s own conscious, shining depth (cit) and thence, continuing the 
inward journey, to the profoundest center and source of reality itself which is bliss (ānanda), pure and infinite, the 
ultimate truth of being.*(footnote:  Sat-cit-āananda (reality or truth/mind or consciousness/bliss) become in 
combination saccidāananda.) 
The expression “Saccidānanda” seems to have arisen spontaneously from the heart of India’s seers, 
when they tried to find some way of referring to the mystery which they intuited beyond the range of thought.  
The welcome given to this term in the tradition undoubtedly proves its affinity to the Hindu soul . . . for many 
hundreds of years it had been accepted in the spiritual vocabulary of India as one of the best symbols for the 
innermost mystery of God himself, so far at least as man is capable of stammering about it.* 
(Abhishiktananda, Saccidananda:  A Christian Approach to Advaitic Experience, Delhi:  I.S.P.C.K., 1974, 
167.) 
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“green leaf.”  This semantic arrangement requires both an abstracting shift (from “sense” 
to “sign-sense) but it also requires a semantic energetics.  There is therefore an abstracted 
exchange between the signs as well as an energetic exchange.  Neither of these exchanges 
may be fully accountable or comprehensible.  The abstracted exchange cannot be 
objectively qualified because the terms of the proposition are already contingent upon the 
use of other contingent terms in the semantic assemblage.  The energetic exchange cannot 
be objectively quantified because the energetics overlaps into the contingencies of the 
abstracted exchange.  The sense(s) and sign(s) of the terms are both contingent and co-
contingent.  However, order is generated, and we are already ante-posed in this order of 
language as the transcendental contingency of the assemblage of language.   
These hypothetical exchanges both express what we ante-pose as the semantic 
order of the real but this order has already been passively generated in order to allow for 
the conception of their ordering.  Sense/sign-sense thought is already an exceptionally 
incepted order before it is a semantic order.     
Investment – Instantiation 
Thus thought appears to be already a self-imposed spontaneous order of the 
semantic register, the order of sense/sense-sign.  This order has been imposed by the 
ante-position of the instantiated sense-to-sign event which is achieved by both the ante-
posed abstraction of the sign but as well by a self-imposed energetic restraint.  The ante-
posed abstracted term as well as the ante-posed energy of the exchange event have 
passively generated an ordered investment which nonetheless becomes the active 
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investment of a now imposed “order” to the world.  The instantiated micro-order of the 
semantic register potentiates the larger investment of the macro-order of the meaning 
registers including, e.g., the “political” or “cultural” orders.   
The semantic register thus both tends to originate passively but also to impose an 
active register upon the macro-cultural orders.  The naming of the world orders the world 
and imposes a semantic dominion upon that named world.  Sense is not lost but 
potentially radically expanded to a larger, more sense-energized potential order of its 
sign-sense.  We cannot discern either a “critical mass” or a non-liminal boundary for a 
hypothetically “pure” sense to achieve sign-sense but rather both are ante-posed 
senses/sign-senses which instantiate alter-native dimensions of a disjunctive composite.  
We can just as easily posit that sense is expanded in the sign-sense register as to say it is 
diminished because of the eccentric semantic and semiotic loops.  Though sign-sense is 
theoretically achieved by energetic restraint, its new expanded sense remains itself of 
unlimited and indefinite potential and immeasurable energy:  the severely repressive 
rhetoric and politic of, e.g., Hitler’s 3rd Reich, nonetheless conquered or threatened to 
conquer most of the Western world.       
The macro orders are therefore seen as contingent upon the stability or 
instabilities of the originating semantic register.  Because the semantic macro-orders such 
as politics and culture originate in the investment of the instantiated sense-to-sign or 
sense/sign-sense micro-register they remain vulnerable to the investments of instantiation 
as well as divestment of disinstantiation:  culture derived from meaning registers may 
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either prosper or decay.  There must reside in the sense/sign-sense event the internal and 
alternative exchange of investment to perpetuate the order of meaning.  
Semiotic Exchange 
 …metaphor is essentially metamorphosis, and indicates how the two objects exchange 
their determinations, exchange even the names which designate them, in the new medium 
which confers the common quality upon them.  Thus in Elstir’s painting, where the sea 
becomes land, the land sea, where the city is designated only by “marine terms” and the 
water by “urban terms.”* [*Proust, I, 835-837]  This is because style, in order to 
spiritualize substance and render it adequate to essence, reproduces the unstable 
opposition, the original complication, the struggle and exchange of the primordial 
elements which constitute essence itself.133 
“Here in the usage of our language we must consider that the ending –ance is undecided 
between active and passive.”134  
As a young child Carl Jung, from the prominence of a large stone, inquired:  “Am 
I the one sitting on the stone or am I the stone upon which he is sitting?” 135   This 
extraordinary soliloquy captures the radical yet ubiquitous siting of awareness because in 
the subtle contrast of speakers we are posed with the question of how or if meaning 
originates as a conjugate of the formation “I” but even more subtly how meaning 
differentiates between its internal registers.  Jung’s relaxation of the pretense of the pure 
“I” allows sense to sense itself as an active and passive intra-sensed field, as the 
exchange between an inflected sense as sense of itself and sense as sense of world as 
world sensing.  In Jung’s configuration sense is imaging itself as neutrally essential (e.g., 
Jung’s experiment pressured his sense to neutralize the weighting of its “subject sense” 
                                                            
133 Deleuze, Proust & Signs, Deleuze, Gilles, Proust & Signs, New York:  George Braziller, Inc., 1972, pp. 47-48. 
134  Derrida, Difference, in Speech and Phenomena, pp. 136-137.   
135 Carl Jung, Memories Dreams Reflections, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, ed. Aniela Jaffé, New York:  Vintage 
Books, 1961, 20.  
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and “predicate-stone/world-sense”) in the energetic momentum of its expression: that is, 
its semantic/semiotic infrastructure abstracted to “I” as subject, “am sitting” as the 
copula/caesura, and “on the stone” as predicate, can now be ordered in the flow of 
subject/predicate but can also be inverted and re-ordered allowing the original predicate 
to be expressed as the subject.  The reader is left in the expressed conundrum of the 
subversive energetics of subject/predicate or now “predicate” as “subject”, and vice 
versa, in a hypothetically indefinite series.  The child’s soliloquy sites the Mobius surface 
of the stone-I as the subtle event of semantic and semiotic exchange and exchangeability 
of the meaning figuration.  The figuration of the stone-I-world is given literally in the 
terms of the soliloquy, but the literal flow is disrupted and subverted to reveal a subtle 
and essential order of meaning which renders either figuration – the “I on the stone” or 
conversely “the I of the stone upon which he is sitting” – in play as now mere symptoms 
of their only figured configuration in the terms.  The literal semantic order is deliteralized 
via the literal to reveal the force of the figuration as anterior to the literal, as its sub- or 
sub-tle but also common Mobiusly looped surface.  And we get to peek through the 
child’s mind’s eye the exchangeability of meaning figurations and their attendant 
energetics. 
If we were chasing the tiger through the woods or over the stone, or if the tiger 
was chasing us, we would be less concerned about the literalizable/deliteralizable 
figuration of the I and the world and we would no doubt be using command literals (as 
literal as possible!) to save our sweet semantic/semiotic asses, so to speak.  Perhaps the 
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stone-I-world instances in the pre-hunt (or post-hunt) and darkly figured cave rituals 
whose traces we find figured on the stone walls of ancient homo-semanticus-semioticus?   
Stones notwithstanding, and returning to our critical trajectory, we can observe 
along with Deleuze that the determinations “…I and the stone” or the “boy and the stone-
I…” “exchange their determinations…even the names which designate them…” 
(footnote 133) and, when we are not chasing or being chased by the tiger, they confer 
more or less “unstable oppositions.”  And, listening to Derrida’s observation, these 
opposing terms and their figurations require passively and/or actively energized 
momentums with which to be “held” or opposed in their figurations.  And though the 
semantic figurations may be only more or less energetically stable in their exchanges, 
their ante-posed essence nonetheless may render the “birth of a world,” an exceptional 
inception and a figuration of meaning.  Such exceptional inceptions may or may not be 
transparent to the question of their passive or active genesis, that is they may be only 
more or less able to hear the child’s soliloquy in the heart and exchanges of their 
expressions. 
However, lurking in Jung’s stoned-world and in the ritualized tiger-world appears 
not only the juxtaposition of the I/stone-I but the syntax and underlying energetics of the 
definitive I and the in-definitive I.  That is, if the “…‘I’ is the stone upon which ‘he’ is 
sitting…” then the I now corresponds to the indefinite field of “…all that is not ▲”:  the 
figuring syntax subject/predicate has been ruptured to expose the always lurking and 
potential “general equation” but now only as expressed symptom.  If the “I” is the world 
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or, for example, the full set of all possible time and space – if only figuratively or 
metaphorically or symptomatically  – then what has entered the limiting syntactical 
structure is the unbounded possibility of “world.”  At the same time, the syntax appears 
to have lost or had suspended its limiting, organizing authority, and we thus find 
ourselves thrust into the “world” of portmanteau expression, Alice or the figurement of 
Alice in Wonderland, or the child Jung and the figurement of Jung in the stone-world.  
Secondly, the subject and predicate are not posited as opposing one an-other but rather as 
alternatives which arise in the figuration of the meaning proposition – that their syntax 
may be inverted allays them as altering natives or alter-natives of a singular meaning 
structure.  This energetic inversion tends to subsume the hypothetical “other” to the 
subset of the total text, that is it tends to subordinate alterity as constituted outside the 
text to now constituted as an expression within the text:  so-called “alterity” is now native 
in the text as alter-native.  Philosophies of alterity are thinkable yet they appear to 
confuse the figuration of the semantic and semiotic order we have proposed:  (a)  They 
remain expressed in the register which first potentiates alterity as at least partially 
registered as sign-sense; (b)  Then the term “alterity” appears to abstract and instantiate 
its sense to an signed exceptional inception; (c) Which subjects it to a more or less 
efficient energetics of its pressured terms in the register; and (d) The composite of which 
further potentiates alterity as dis-instantiateable to the extent that this very composite 
process is now exfoliated to its possible and also exceptionally excepted terms and 
conditions.  “Alterity” thus falls into the set of portmanteau terms which are themselves 
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subject to the semantic and semiotic registers.  Though portmanteau terms may express 
“alterity” or “God” or “..that than which…” they do not exit the meaning register but 
rather they remain instantiated as expressions of the sense/sign-sense register as part of 
the exceptional inception of the order of thought.  For Deleuze, The transcendental 
remains textually empirical.  We are thus in league with Derrida’s assertion that 
philosophy must re-vise its conceptualization of text as mere supplement to speech136; 
this revision appears to be potentiated by the revival of not merely the question of how 
we think we can express meaning in text but rather how the supplement is energized 
within the semantic and semiotic registers as the limited and unlimited expression of the 
full equation of difference, that is as the always implied if truncated “▲and all that is not 
▲…”  
Summary of Semantic/Semiotic Exchange:  The pressure point of our soliloquy 
(on I’s and stones and tigers) would be to consider an accounting of the semantic and 
semiotic and now energetic registers which appear to be revealed in the exchange and 
exchangeability of any proposed subject/copula/predicate.  Even if incomplete or 
penultimate, such an accounting reveals the instability of any universal structure to 
thought.  That is, we have observed in our examination of the semantic surface the need 
to account for the instantiation of the sensed object to what we have termed sign-sense 
and we have termed this play the “ante” or the wager of sign-sense to speak or textualize 
the objects of sense.  There is an energetic exchange as objects of sense textualize to 
                                                            
136 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. G.C. Spivak, Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976, pp. 6-7. 
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sign-sense and this exchange may be observed to be more or less stable.  However, the 
play of sign-sense is itself always in the play of the general equation of language or the 
assemblage of other alternative senses.  But this observation is always potentiated 
(whether acknowledged or unacknowledged) by the convergence of sense and sign-sense 
as the exceptional inception of thought derived from the general equation of difference or 
“▲and all that is not ▲…”  The text “▲” appears not be fully comprehensible or 
composite without “…and all that is not ▲.” 
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VI.   Summary and Implications 
Every historical rupture, every advent of a new master-signifier, changes retroactively the 
meaning of all tradition, restructures the narration of the past, makes it readable in 
another, new way.137 
Returning to our thesis statements, we may observe: 
If Anselm’s, or Shaikh Ahmad Al-‘Alawī’s, or Lonergan’s statements express the 
term ‘God,’ then this term may be read as the backgrounding “boundedness” of the third 
term of “religio” and furthermore may be understood as the desire for the complete 
epistemological condition of thought; language expresses this condition in statements of 
‘meaning.’ 
If ‘religion’ expresses this desire in texts and ritual practice, and this ‘third term’ 
is understood as the condition of being ‘bounded to or by,’ then the study of religion is 
itself bounded to this desire for the completion of thought, and its study requires the 
continuous and radical epistemological interrogation of its expressions in the semantic 
and semiotic registers.      
Following Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism, this desire for the complete 
epistemological condition of thought cannot be understood as an ‘alterity’ of thought but 
is rather the internal native or ‘alter-native’ condition of thought itself.   
The ‘religions’ constitute in native texts and ritual practices this desire to know 
and express this complete condition.  While they appear to each claim an exceptional 
inception to the expression, because the expression emerges from the energetic and 
unstable disjunctive synthesis of difference each expression appears therefore to be 
                                                            
137 Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, New York:  Verso, 1999, pp. 55-56. 
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rendered unstable and open to differentiation.  As such, each religion expresses itself as a 
‘singularity’ of this universal condition of thought. However, because of the native 
factors in the epistemological condition, specifically, that thought desires but cannot fully 
express the condition, no particular religion can claim hegemony to the expression of the 
condition:  ‘God’ as such is the full expression of thought, yet by the ‘definition’ of the 
terms of thought, its expression remains fully its alter-native exception to thought. 
Finally, the academic study of religious texts and rituals would appear to be 
incomplete and epistemologically nonsensical without their third native term, religio as 
“bounded to or by.”  An internal semiotic symptomatology pervades the semantic 
register:  the terms of the text and ritual are always called by the “sacred.”  There persists 
a bounded and unbounded theological imperative to the discipline. 
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